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**ISSUES RELATED TO H.R. 5200, THE NA-
TIONAL DEFENSE ENHANCEMENT AND
NATIONAL GUARD EMPOWERMENT ACT
OF 2006**

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

HEARING HELD
JUNE 13, 2006



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**ISSUES RELATED TO H.R. 5200, THE NATIONAL DEFENSE
ENHANCEMENT AND NATIONAL GUARD EMPOWER-
MENT ACT OF 2006**

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, June 13, 2006.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:07 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Duncan Hunter (chairman of the committee) presiding.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DUNCAN HUNTER, A REP-
RESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON ARMED SERVICES**

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order.

This hearing is the result of a commitment I made at the committee's markup in May of the GV Sonny Montgomery National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2007. Then the committee decided to defer action on H.R. 5200, the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, by asking the Commission on the national guard and reserves to report not later than March 1, 2007, on the advisability and feasibility of implementing H.R. 5200.

During the discussion of H.R. 5200 in committee, members made clear their strong interest in an oversight effort to address problems and issues with the current system for structuring, equipping, manning, training and resourcing the national guard, not only for missions conducted in accordance with Title 10 of the United States Code under the control of the secretary of defense and the combatant commanders, but also for operations conducted by the national guard in accordance with Title 32 United States Code under the control of the governor of a state.

This hearing is part of that committee oversight effort to define and examine the issues and problems tied to the national guard national defense relationships and the national defense and homeland defense missions that they carry out. We have two exceptional panels of witnesses today who are well qualified to help us begin to understand the challenges for improving the ability of the national guard to meet the requirements of its Federal and state missions.

Before I introduce our first panel, I want to turn to my good friend, the ranking member, Mr. Skelton, for any remarks he would like to make.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hunter can be found in the Appendix on page 53.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM MISSOURI, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON
ARMED SERVICES**

Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Chairman, thank you, and thank you for calling this hearing. We have a very distinguished panel today, and we look forward to hearing them.

This is certainly a timely hearing, for the combat units with the Army national guard, which have acquitted themselves so tremendously in their service since 9/11, are nearly exhausted. Once they provided a large percentage of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, they now provide only a few. We have used them up, and when they are done, they won't be available for many years.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) was a surprise to many of us. It was then we realized the full extent of the Department of Defense's designs on the guard. The QDR called for a 17,000-man cut in the force over time. Soon thereafter, the Army was here to declare that they were not going to fully fund the guard's end-strength. It was only through the actions of this committee that we will continue to pay for the full 348,000-man end-strength this year.

As my friend Gene Taylor of Mississippi knows better than most, the role of the guard is not just national defense. The guard's response to Katrina was heroic, but nobody would argue that they were fully equipped or fully manned for the job. Katrina caught some Gulf state units deployed. It caught others under-equipped because of their recent deployments and exposed other weaknesses.

This hearing today begins a process of looking at the national guard and how it is organized, trained, equipped to meet the demands of the 21st century. H.R. 5200 is a bold step to try to deal with some of those challenges. It offers some intriguing approaches to some of the perceived problems and it would fundamentally change the way the guard fits into our national and homeland defense architecture.

These questions and others are exactly the sort of thing this committee had in mind when we created the Commission on the national guard and reserves in last year's bill. That is exactly why we have asked them to look at the advisability and feasibility of implementing H.R. 5200 in this year's bill. They have the resident expertise and the resources to fully investigate these issues.

Until the commission does report, however, it is entirely consistent with this committee's oversight function that we take this opportunity to explore some of the challenges facing the guard today. Fundamental change may be warranted, so we must approach this process cautiously. We need to fully understand the challenges facing the guard. We must define the problems precisely and explore all the implications of the proposed solutions to those problems.

This has the potential to significantly alter the way the Department of Defense (DOD) provides for our national security; how both the Department of Defense and the Department of Homeland Security provide for our domestic security; and how able the national guard is to respond to their own state command and control apparatus in times of domestic crisis such as national disasters.

When Congress looked at changes of this magnitude, we studied them over several years. We held multiple hearings and detailed

briefings. What finally emerged was Goldwater-Nichols and it was years in the making. We got it basically right in the end because we took the time up front to do it right at the very beginning. We should keep all of that in mind.

That said, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to today's testimony. I would like to hear your perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the systems in place for structuring, manning, equipping, and training the guard. Again, I thank the gentlemen before us for their testimony and for their appearance today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 57.]

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

With us on our first panel we have the Honorable Gordon R. England, Deputy Secretary of Defense; Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, United States Navy, Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; General Richard Cody, U.S. Army, Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Army; and General John D. W. Corley, United States Air Force, Vice Chief of Staff, Department of the Air Force.

Gentlemen, first, thanks for your extraordinary service. You all have a lot of irons in the fire right now, at work on multiple issues on a daily basis. You are doing, in my estimation, a wonderful job. Along that line, we have hearings to try to figure out how we do things better, but I think it is always important for us to remember that we do a lot of things right.

One thing that we are doing right with respect to the national guard is going to war truly with the total force. I can remember the days of Vietnam when the national guard was perceived as a way that you didn't go into the warfighting theater. Today, we go with the total force, and that includes great participation, intense participation by the national guard.

On that point, just talking with members of our staff who have just gotten back from a whirlwind tour to the theaters, I was reminded that the national guard is, to some degree, kind of a special forces operation, and that as we put together these regional teams in Afghanistan, and we are going to follow that model in Iraq, and we need somebody who has some agricultural capability and that would in some cases come from the Department of Agriculture. You need expertise, and legal expertise, and that might come from the attorney general's shop. But you need it now and you need it there, and you can't wait for interagency wrangling to settle down before you get it.

The national guard has stepped in. I was reminded that in one case, the agriculture adviser now in a province in a location in Afghanistan is a national guard guy who was a Future Farmers of America (FFA) leader. The people who were giving their engineering advice to regional construction teams are national guardsmen who have that background. And it goes down the line.

The national guardsmen coming from all walks of life in this country really have an extraordinary capability to help reconstruct and rebuild in occupied territory. That great talent is being focused in that important area.

So I want to open this hearing with this positive understanding that the national guard right now is doing a lot of things right,

being a wonderful part of this total force, undertaking very difficult missions. Gentlemen, you have all been a very important part of the leadership, of shaping these missions in such a way that the guard is very effective and a very important part of this total force.

So having said that, Secretary England, thank you for being with us. You are a full service operator. You have been here in lots of capacities, but you have a trademark, and that trademark is problem-solving. So tell us how you think the guard is doing, and if you think we have problems that need to be solved. The floor is yours, sir.

**STATEMENT OF HON. GORDON R. ENGLAND, DEPUTY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE**

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Chairman, pardon me, I have a little bit of a problem speaking today, so if you will bear with me.

Mr. Chairman and Representative Skelton, members of the committee, I thank you for the opportunity to appear today to discuss with you the issues related to H.R. 5200. I also want to thank you and all the members of the committee for your continued strong support for our men and women who wear the cloth of our nation and for their families.

It is always a pleasure to participate in hearings with my good friends and partners, Admiral Ed Giambastiani, General Dick Cody, and General John Corley. Now, in some ways today's discussion represents a continuation of an ongoing dialogue. In 2001, as you are aware, the new administration inherited a military force that was under-resourced and was still largely configured for the Cold War era. This included the national guard.

Secretary Rumsfeld, recognizing that this new era required new approaches, launched the Department on an aggressive process of transformation, a transformation of the total force that is still ongoing today. A major premise of the transformation is the reality that the national guard is an inseparable component of the joint total force and will play an ever more prominent role in the future.

One aspect of transformation consists of assessing and updating how the guard, as part of this total force, is structured and resourced, with particular emphasis on integration. In these deliberations, it is essential to recognize that the national guard is not a separate military service. Rather, the national guard is an integral part of the U.S. Army, an integral part of the U.S. Air Force, and any future organizational changes need to reflect this vital feature.

This is one reason why DOD does not support a four-star chief of the National Guard Bureau, nor the bureau chief's membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you will recognize, there has long been debate about the most effective role of the national guard. Tension can always exist between some governors with their Title 32 responsibilities, and the Department of Defense with its Title 10 responsibilities.

As we go forward, these responsibilities need to be well balanced and well understood, especially as the national guard takes on more of the burden of operations abroad and here at home. As a result of lessons learned from Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), and Katrina, and discussions about

the national guard in the Quadrennial Defense Review, the department recognizes there is room for improvement.

The national guard and the department as a whole have learned a lot about current and future roles and are continuing the analysis of enhancements. I am especially pleased that the Congress authorized the Commission on the national guard and reserves to undertake a comprehensive independent assessment of the total reserve component of the United States military. While the department does not support H.R. 5200 as proposed, it does look forward to evaluating the findings and recommendations of the commission.

It is also important that the Congress not rush to judgment with H.R. 5200. By way of historic reverence, it took more than 4 years of study to produce the Goldwater-Nichols Act and 16 years of limited participation before the commandant of the Marine Corps became a full member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Profound issues are contained in H.R. 5200 and time is needed to allow for follow-through and constructive discussion and evaluation. I personally ask the committee not to adopt H.R. 5200, but at a minimum to wait until all review efforts are completed next year before decision.

I thank you again for your time and interest in studying this very, very important issue. I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Secretary England can be found in the Appendix on page 62.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Admiral Giambastiani, thank you for being with us and for your service to our country. What do you think?

**STATEMENT OF ADM. EDMUND P. GIAMBASTIANI, VICE
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. NAVY**

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Chairman Hunter, Congressman Skelton, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, I too am honored to be here and pleased to appear before you with Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England and also two fellow vice chiefs of the Air Force and the Army, General John Corley and General Dick Cody. Chairman Hunter, I have submitted a statement for the record. I don't intend to include it all and request that it be made part of the record.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, Admiral, your statement and all statements will be taken into the record, so feel free to summarize.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Thank you. I will not repeat all of the points that are in that here. I will make it very short. I would like to focus, however, on what I think the real issue, the reason for this hearing is and should be, and that is the even greater integration of the national guard and reserve, both operationally in the field and in the policy resources and requirements processes in the Pentagon.

The transformation of the national guard and the reserve from a mobilization-centric strategic reserve during the Cold War, to an operational reserve and a strategic reserve, both of them, today is the fundamental driver of this greater integration. Simply stated, we could not execute our missions across the Department of Defense in this world today without the national guard and reserve.

So this discussion we are having is extremely important and I am pleased to be able to contribute. Given that many of the structures of the national guard were established before Goldwater-Nichols, before we had combatant commands, and before we have come to rely on the national guard as an operational reserve, it is appropriate, as the deputy secretary mentioned, that we look carefully at how we organize, train and equip the national guard for the roles it plays, both for the president in executing the national security strategy, and for each governor in response to domestic emergencies and contingencies.

It is also more important that we get this right, rather than implementing some type of solution quickly. So thank you again for all of the committee support for our armed service members, active, guard, reserve, and importantly, their families and for the opportunity to appear before you today on this important subject.

Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Giambastiani can be found in the Appendix on page 66.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.

General Cody, thank you for your service, and especially your focus on the warfighting theaters in these very important times. You know a lot about operations and how the Guard has performed so well in these operations. What is your perspective, sir?

**STATEMENT OF GEN. RICHARD CODY, VICE CHIEF OF STAFF,
U.S. ARMY**

General CODY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you today about our Army, active guard and reserve. I know the focus of the hearing today is about better integrating the national guard.

On behalf of our secretary, Dr. Harvey, and our chief of staff, and approximately one million active, guard and reserve soldiers that are your Army, more than 120,000 of them today are serving in harm's way in Afghanistan and Iraq. Let me offer a sincere thank you for your untiring efforts by this committee to ensure that our soldiers have the essential resources that they require to continue this fight on this war on terror.

Let me begin by saying it takes an entire Army, as part of the joint and interagency effort, to prevail in this long war against terrorism and meet the worldwide operational requirements and provide support to civil authorities here at home. The Army National Guard is an integral part of this total force effort, both abroad and at home.

Since 9/11, Army guardsmen have comprised over 170,000 of the more than 650,000 Army soldiers who have been deployed to fight global terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the past 5 years, over 40,000 Army guardsmen have been part of the nationwide effort to secure the homeland. Last year, over 50,000 Army guardsmen, along with more than 10,000 active duty and Army Reserve soldiers and civilians responded to assist their fellow citizens during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

We entered this long war on terror with a Cold War structure: the reserve components that were principally elements of a strate-

gic reserve; a tiered readiness model; and a \$56 billion equipment shortfall across the entire Army resulting from years of procurement investment shortfalls.

Many of our units, especially within the reserve components, were inadequately manned and equipped, requiring the Army to pool personnel and equipment from across the force to make them whole before they deployed. Since 9/11, we have adopted standardized, brigade-based modular formations for all our components, active, guard and reserve, to facilitate interoperability and increase readiness across the force, as well as increased equipment levels.

We are re-balancing the entire Army to ensure we have the right types of units and skills that are in the greatest demand: infantry, engineer, military police, military intelligence, special operations forces, chemical, civil affairs, and psychological units. We have implemented a cyclic Army force generation model to manage force availability, force readiness, synchronize the preparation of all Army forces, and most importantly, provide predictability to our civilian soldiers and families and employers.

The role of our reserve components has changed from that of a strategic to an operational reserve, which in the case of the Army National Guard, a concurrent state mission responsibility. The Army Guard is reorganizing to better meet its dual mission requirements for combat and homeland defense and security.

In doing so, we are striking a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support capabilities and capacities to provide this nation with the ability to sustain combat forces for the Global War on Terror, and increase the capabilities to the governors for statewide missions.

The Army has spent \$21 billion to the Army National Guard procurement in fiscal years 2005 through 2011, a four-fold increase from the previous budget, to fully modernize and give them front-line equipment. We have identified a baseline equipment set for domestic missions and have prioritized fueling to the Army Guard so they can fulfill their state mission responsibilities. Additionally, we have identified and provided over 1,000 items of equipment to the eight most critical states for the current hurricane season.

The realities of the post-9/11 security environment have resulted in unprecedented levels of total force integration. To generate and sustain the force required to wage this Global War on Terror and fulfill other operational requirements abroad and at home, it takes the entire Army, active, guard and reserve. The best way to guarantee success to have a fully integrated total force would be with unit of effort, unity of command, and unity of resourcing, and the flexibility to respond rapidly for changing requirements at home and abroad.

We look forward to working with this committee and the Commission on the national guard and reserves as we examine ways to best ensure we have total force integration. Let me close by sharing with you that the soldiers of all our components continue to serve magnificently as we engage in this fifth year on this Global War on Terror.

They continue to distinguish themselves with tremendous acts of courage in places like Baghdad, Ramadi, Mosul, and Khandahar. I know most of you members have visited our soldiers there. They

understand they are waging a long war and they believe in their mission.

Their commitment and their willingness to sacrifice all so that others can live in freedom in this nation personifies our nation's highest ideals. Our nation must remain equally committed to them by providing them the resources they need to succeed in their mission in this long war. With your help, I know they will be successful.

Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Cody can be found in the Appendix on page 73.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, General.

General Corley, thank you for your appearance here today and for your service to the country. Let us know what you think.

**STATEMENT OF GEN. JOHN D.W. CORLEY, VICE CHIEF OF
STAFF, U.S. AIR FORCE**

General CORLEY. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Hunter and Representative Skelton and distinguished members of the committee, thanks for the opportunity to talk to you today and to speak about your United States Air Force, and in particular an important part of our family, the Air National Guard. On behalf of Secretary Wynn and Chief Moseley, and especially the men and women of the United States Air Force, let me express my gratitude to the essential work that this committee is taking right now.

Over the past 15 years, our total force has been at war. If you think in terms of Desert Storm and Desert Fox and Allied Force and Operations Northern and Operations Southern Watch and Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom and Operation Noble Eagle, airmen, whether they are active duty or national guardsmen or Air Force Reservists, they are working side-by-side with our sister service. This total force integration is our answer to organizing, training and equipping the guard, the reserves and the active duty forces.

It provides America with a capable Air Force for the joint team. Under total force, we think of all airmen, not just in terms of active duty, guard or reserve labels, but rather as members of one team. Now, we haven't always gotten this 100 percent right, but I do believe we are on the right path, and we are working hard to provide America's people the best air and space power possible.

Maybe in short, just a little bit of a story. When I was commissioned right at the end of the Vietnam War, the 192nd Fighter Wing just down the road in Richmond, Virginia was flying the F-105 Thunderchief. Clearly, it had been a workhorse of the Vietnam War and before that. The 192nd was going to continue to fly that aircraft for nearly a decade beyond the Vietnam War.

I will be honest with you: It was tired and it was old. Today, pilots in the 192nd are flying the newest and most capable fighter, the F-22. We are continuing to make significant progress in other equipping issues and other equipment initiatives, like C-17 associate units in Alaska and Hawaii where guardsmen fly our newest cargo aircraft, and we have guard units out in front of new and emerging missions like the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle in

places like Texas, Arizona, New York, North Dakota, California and Nevada.

This total force integration is a collaborative process also. It is based on the trust developed across those three components. We are working toward a common goal of providing combatant commander with air and space power. To help us guide that collaborative process, we formed a new directorate to do it. It is responsible for all the coordinating with the guard and the reserve, especially on those new and emerging missions, and developing total force organizational constructs, and it is led by guardsmen.

We have with us today Brigadier General Allison Hickey. She is the one that has been leading that instructed effort to move us forward on all those emerging missions and all that we are doing. The total force is reflected in everything we do as an Air Force, from assigning the right mission mix, to formulating policy, to organizing active, guard and reserve components, to deploying forces both at home and abroad; to our budgetary and programmatic decisions.

Everything we do reflects the commitment to ensure the guard, as well as the active duty and reserve forces, remain ready and resourced to perform their missions. We have 33,000 airmen that are forward-deployed in support of combatant commanders. At any one point, sir, that is 25 percent guard and reserve constituting it. At this very moment, national guard pilots are flying national guard aircraft. They are flying missions alongside of their active duty pilots.

We are simultaneously flying missions in Operation Noble Eagle defending our homeland. Frankly, since 9/11 alone, 44,000 fighter or refueling airborne early warning sorties have been flown in defense of the United States, and nearly 80 percent of those were Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve forces.

So while we are busy fighting and helping win today's war, we are also working in partnership to determine the future of those missions and our components, and ensuring the total force, the total integrated force remains ready and resourced. Maintaining, modernizing and recapitalizing our forces is the right thing to do for America. Since 2001, we have been moving in that partnership with the department to transform. We have helped reorganize the guard and reserve because we know they are the absolutely critical contributors to transformation.

Our Air Force Quadrennial Defense Review Office was led by another guardsman, General Ron Bath, and our new Air National Guard bureau chief, Lieutenant General McKinley, just finished a tour as the deputy of all Air Force plans and programs. I mention those names not just to show the relationship of trust and the integration, but to show that we are putting the right people in the right positions.

The other point I would like to stress is that as an Air Force, we just don't think of them as guard, active, or reserve. We think of them as airmen contributing to the joint fight.

So in summary, continuing total force integration is the way to successfully fight this war on terror. Total force integration is the right roadmap to give combatant commanders what they need to defend this nation.

Thanks for the opportunity to share my thoughts with you this afternoon. The Air Force looks forward to working with this committee on this critical matter.

[The prepared statement of General Corley can be found in the Appendix on page 78.]

The CHAIRMAN. General, thank you.

And thanks to all of our witnesses.

Ladies and gentlemen, we have a lot of members here today, so we are going to go on the five-minute clock. I would ask all members to make sure that your colleague gets a chance to ask his questions by making sure that yours is concise. I would ask our witnesses to try to make your answers concise so that we get question and answer in under five minutes.

Along that vein, Mr. Conaway, you have been on the short end of the stick on a number of the last several hearings, where you get here first and you don't get your question in. So I am going to yield my time to the gentleman from Texas. The gentleman from Texas is the closest one to the witnesses, so I think this is very appropriate that he starts out.

Mr. Conaway.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I get to look them right in the eye.

Thank you, gentlemen, for coming today. I appreciate it. As always, I learn a lot when you guys come to visit with us.

When the 2007 budget came out and the QDR and the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and everything, there was a great uproar over what appeared to be a downsizing of the guard, particularly the Army, funding 333,000 slots versus 350,000. That seemed to be more misunderstanding than anything else as to what the true reflection of DOD's intent was. Governors and the guard leadership seemed to be surprised as well.

Can you speak to us a little bit about how, today, what the coordination looks like between governors and between the state leadership of the guard and DOD as all of this is moving forward? From the comments, particularly from General Cody and General Corley, we are on a smooth glide-path and everything is working great. What would be the coordination between the states?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Conaway, before I turn it over to General Cody, can I just make one statement? I heard earlier a statement that was made that our intent was to reduce the national guard by 17,000. I mean, that is absolutely not correct. I don't know where that came from, frankly. It was never a finding of the QDR. It was never the position of the department.

It merely reflected the financial side, that is the Army's view was that the national guard likely would not recruit to the 350,000, and therefore the department in fiscal prudence said, then we will fund the limit where you have it, which is 333,000, which was our expectation for recruiting, but then said we would fund whatever level that the guard recruited, up to 350,000.

So there was never any intent on behalf of the Department of Defense to reduce the guard to 333,000 people. It was only we did not want to leave the money "on the table" if the guard had not recruited to that level, but we always committed to pay the bill if

they had recruited to that level, and that is still the case today. So I did want to clarify that, and I thank you for bringing that up.

I will say regarding your question about your relationship, I believe, frankly, the relationship is very good between the department. As General Cody said, we have invested heavily in our national guard, both for combat missions and so they can do the dual mission of homeland security.

Now, of course, we are into the hurricane season. That has been close with all the states. It is close, I think, in all regards. So we do have a well-working relationship with the governors and with the Adjutant Generals (TAGs), and I will let General Cody elaborate on that, because he is frankly closer to that with the national guard under his wing.

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.

The chief of the National Guard Bureau, the director of the Army National Guard, as well as the deputy director of operations in the Army who is a national guard general, all participate weekly with me and the other Army staff on all facets of what the Army is doing right now, from mobilization to sourcing of the Global War on Terror, to BRAC, the integrated global basing strategy, the Army modular force, as well as the equipping conferences we have. We meet once a week with the vice chief of staff of the Army, and many times I have the under secretary of the Army.

We have been doing that since this Global War on Terror started. The confusion or the lack of information that was not provided on the program decision memorandum three that generated the pass-back to all the different services started in October 2005, and was pre-decisional.

As we walked all the way through from October through December and January, there were no less than 19 meetings with guard and myself. It was a very small group because it was pre-QDR and it was pre-budget submission, and we had not made the final decisions.

These were courses of actions that were being looked at. Our chief has testified that we would have liked to have done that process better. We would have liked to have brought all the TAGs in and worked through that. I think what you saw at the end once it was all laid out, and I briefed all the TAGs, and we briefed all the governors, that we have a common vision of exactly where we are going, total force, and the end-strength of the guard will be where it is.

We are re-balancing this for us to get the right capabilities and capacity for homeland security and homeland defense, as well as to sustain a Global War on Terror. The national guard is fully involved in that re-balancing. We have ten adjutants generals on a general officer steering committee with reserve and active generals, all formulating the plan and exactly what type of units we are going to have in each state. And then we are working through that process.

This is going to take five to six years as we do this. We are doing it simultaneously while we are fighting this Global War on Terror. So I think the processes are there. The integration is there. We are getting great leadership from the joint staff. Admiral Giambastiani has participated in three of those sessions with us. I think it is un-

fortunate that it came out the way it did. We would like to have done it better, but I think we are on the right path.

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your kindness to let me start the questions today. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. Excellent questions.

The gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Skelton.

Mr. SKELTON. The Department of Defense QDR, Mr. Secretary, did not fund 17,000 national guardsmen. Is that not correct?

Secretary ENGLAND. The QDR doesn't fund anything. Mr. Skelton—

Mr. SKELTON. Just yes or no? Is that not correct?

Secretary ENGLAND. That is not correct, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. Did you fully fund the national guard figure?

Secretary ENGLAND. First of all, Mr. Skelton, the QDR is not a funding vehicle at all.

Mr. SKELTON. I understand that.

Secretary ENGLAND. It did not recommend a cut to the national guard.

Mr. SKELTON. I am talking about a funding, the 348,000 was underfunded by your recommendation by 17,000. Is that not correct?

Secretary ENGLAND. Sir, the Department of Defense fully committed to fund 350,000. That was our commitment. We did not want to fund money if the guard did not recruit to that level. So the only question was: What level would the guard recruit to? No matter what number, between 333,000 and 350,000 that the guard recruited to, we were committed to fund.

From day one, we said whatever that number was, we would fund. If they were 350,000, which they were at the time we did the budget, we funded where they were in actual manpower and we said if they recruit above that number, then we will fund above that number to the authorized level of 350,000. The department funded where they were at the time we turned in the budget, and committed to fund at 350,000 if they indeed recruited higher than 333,000 to the 350,000.

Mr. SKELTON. And did you identify where that money would come from for that additional 17,000 troops?

Secretary ENGLAND. No, we didn't. We said that as we got to that point, typically as we go into the budget, we have better visibility in terms of where we can reprogram money. So we didn't identify, because typically you don't know early on. As time goes on, you can identify those sources more accurately. We merely said that we would reprogram the funds if they were required.

Mr. SKELTON. You do understand this committee did fund that 17,000.

Secretary ENGLAND. I understand you did, and I thank you, but we would have if you had not. We still had that commitment.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you, sir.

General Cody, how many Army National Guardsmen have been deployed at one time in the recent two or three years?

General CODY. Congressman, I know it is over 170,000 since we started this Global War on Terror. That number I believe accounts for one Social Security number. What I don't know inside that number is how many have deployed twice, because as you know, we have some special forces in the 19th and the 20th that may

have deployed twice. I need to take that for the record and come back to you.

Mr. SKELTON. My question is, how many have been deployed one time; how many have been deployed twice; and how many have been deployed three times. If you would take that for the record.

General CODY. Yes, sir.

Mr. SKELTON. General, from time to time, there are national guardsmen who are not deployed and some who are deployed, and I just can't say enough good things about them. They are true patriots, as you well know. But from time to time, I hear the phrase "we are treated like second-class soldiers." How do we overcome that syndrome, General?

General CODY. I believe we overcome it by leadership. It has gotten better each year since we started with the mobilization. As you know, the 39th out of Arkansas, the 30th out of North Carolina, and the 81st, those were three first full-up brigade combat teams that we mobilized for rotation two. We had some of that feedback, as you know.

Our training that we do through our First Army and through our Fifth Army, I have been there and I have asked some of the soldiers. Some of the older soldiers feel like they could not have to do some of the training. But you have to understand, as I talk to them, I say, you know, these trainers in the First Army and Fifth Army have a moral obligation to ensure that you go into harm's way well trained with the most current tactics, techniques and procedures.

At the same time, we have to work through transmitting better before they are mobilized, during the alert process, what type of training and what type of interchange we are going to have in terms of their readiness status. So I believe it starts with leadership. We need to do more of it. I have talked to our commanders about it, and we are just going to have to continue to work it.

Mr. SKELTON. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Saxton.

Mr. SAXTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

A lot of things changed in 2001 with regard to the way we train and fight. With regard to the national guard, a lot of things certainly changed. When we began to mobilize and deploy national guard troops, we found out that we had to train against improvised explosive devices (IED). We found out that we had to help people learn how to be in isolated places and forward-operating bases. The national guard took on the responsibility of doing these things.

As things changed and policymakers watched, the secretary of defense recommended to the Base Realignment and Closure Commission that we need to find some new ways to mobilize and train national guard troops for deployment. One of the recommendations that he made was that we stand up joint mobilization and training centers. I am curious as to how that process is going forward.

General Cody and I talked about this earlier today. I am just interested, Mr. Secretary, in your take on how we are doing with these joint mobilization and training centers.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Saxton, I don't believe I can speak to you directly on that subject, except to say in a macro sense I have a review about once a month with all the BRAC people to understand how the total BRAC process is going. That is, how are they doing in terms of milestones and expenditures and progress. On the basis of those reviews, we are on track with the BRAC total process in terms of moving forward after the bill was passed.

Mr. SAXTON. If I could just interrupt you before my time expires. General Cody, would you tell us where you think we are?

General CODY. With our forces command, Congressman, we are looking at our power projections platforms across active, guard and reserve to take a look at, you used the term "joint." Right now, we need to work a little bit more on the "joint" piece of it. We are looking at the mobilization piece. Although we are taking airmen and naval personnel as part of that, now we are doing some joint solutions.

We have not come to the issue that you want to discuss in terms of where we are at Fort Dix, but we are looking at five or six places in the continental United States, with the military construction (MILCON) and with the BRAC that we are doing, as well as the re-location and re-balancing of the footprint of the guard and reserves to get the best places for the mobilization, whether it is at Atterbury or Camp Shelby or at Dix or one of our active duty places where we have made a significant investment in ranges.

So that is the balance we are trying to work out as we go through the BRAC process. We owe you a better answer back on Fort Dix.

Mr. SAXTON. Okay, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Ortiz.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

One of my concerns, and maybe I can get a better grasp, if I understand correctly, the national guard really has two missions. They respond to a particular mission through the governor of the state. They respond to hurricanes, tornadoes, flooding and things like that, and they have to train for that.

On the other hand, when they get activated by the president, they undertake a different mission. I just want to understand better where do they get the training once they are activated? And how can you train for both missions? I was a member of the reserves, not the national guard, after I left the Army. When I was in the reserves, I knew what my mission was when we were activated. But maybe you can describe a little bit more, General Cody or Mr. Secretary?

General CODY. Thank you, Congressman.

That is a strategic point that you just made. Before we started this transformation, we didn't have the right types of formations and the right type of balance across our force. What we are doing now with the re-balancing of the national guard in particular in combat, combat support, combat service support, is to get that blend within each one of the states so that we have the depth and capacity and capabilities that we need for the warfight to augment when we bring them on Federal duty, but at the same time recog-

nize that a place like one of the states that has flooding probably needs more engineer and more transportation units, and not tank units and not artillery units.

So during their annual training (AT), during their Title 32 training, they are being trained in those military occupational specialty (MOS), whether it is water distribution as a reverse osmosis purification unit (ROPU) outfit, transportation for hauling things, general support aviation, Chinooks and Black Hawks; military police (MPs). They are being trained in their military occupational skill that directly transfers over to a civilian assistance if they have to be brought on by the state.

So that is the balance right now we are trying to fix, to provide the right balance for dual mission for the state mission, as well as for the warfight.

Mr. ORTIZ. I know that. In fact this coming Saturday there is a group of soldiers from my district who will be activated. They are going to Iraq. What kind of training do they get before they go to Iraq?

General CODY. We have what we call a training certification document that has been updated several times since this war started, from central command (CENTCOM), General Abizaid. It is really generated up through General Casey's headquarters. In there, they lay out the different individual and collective tasks for the types of units that they need to be certified on, whether it is patrolling; whether it is counter-IED training; whether it is convoy security. In an aviation unit, it is day and night operations in support of ground, like we are doing with the 36th combat aviation brigade out of Texas.

So each type unit has that type of training, and then the First Army and, well, now all of the First Army does this with the training support battalions and brigades. They take those soldiers through the individual training and the collective training, and then they certify them.

And then downrange, when they get there as part of their two-week joint integration, they get further training in IEDs that we can't right now do here in this country because of the jammers and other things, and the live training requirements. So they get trained extensively on IEDs, and then they have a two-week right-seat/left-seat ride with the unit they are taking over, to be brought up to the most current tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in the area that they are going to be operating in.

Mr. ORTIZ. And you feel comfortable that this training is adequate before they—

General CODY. It is the best training I have seen in the 34 years I have been in uniform. I was at Camp Atterbury two weeks ago and I talked to a, believe it or not, a San Antonio unit, the 217th transportation. They were going on their second tour, most of them volunteers, and the major who was the company commander down there told me it was the best training he had seen since he had been in.

Mr. ORTIZ. I just have one last question. I understand that the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has four national guard generals. Am I correct when I say that, that serve on the Northern Command staff?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could, Congressman.

Mr. ORTIZ. Yes, sir?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. The chief of staff of NORTHCOM is an Air Force or an Air National Guard officer. His name is Major General Paul Sullivan. He has been an Air Guard officer his whole life. So he is the number three in command, the chief of staff. And there are a total of five other officers on the Northern Command staff who are national guard and reserve, who are one or two stars. And we will get you the exact breakdown of that five, but they are national guard and reserve officers.

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much.

My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Thornberry.

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I appreciated the effort you made in your written statement to try to put some context on this issue, because sometimes I think we are walking in in the middle of a conversation, where we are arguing about whether there is representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, how much we are going to fund, how many people. When really, we have to do the first part first, and that is come to some clear understanding about the role of the guard in our military today.

I guess what I am looking for is some reassurance that those first questions are going to be asked and thought about and explored, whether through this commission or through other study at the Department of Defense, because it has just been clear to me that obviously the world has changed, that the expectations for our military have changed, much more homeland security, much more now on the border.

Are we looking at those first fundamental questions about the best role for the guard as well as the reserve, and how to meet that need, without using buzz words that automatically assume that we have to have a guard person stuck into every level of anything that we do?

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Congressman, that has been the discussion since 2001. It has been the discussion, and I will tell you, on an ongoing basis in the Department of Defense as we try to restructure the total force. In my opening comments, I allude to the fact that we were a Cold War force in 2001, and we have been moving away from that. Our national guard and our reserves were a Cold War force at that time.

Now that we are a total integrated force, the whole effort has been how do we make this an integrated force with our guard and reserve. As you have heard from General Cody and also General Corley, the national guard and reserves are an integral part of the force right now. In fact, Admiral Giambastiani made the same comment. We could not do the mission without the guard and reserve as an integral part.

So at one point it was a strategic reserve, and it was before 2001. It was a strategic reserve, and now it is an operational force. So you are absolutely right. I mean, the role is very important. There has always been this evolving role, but at this point I believe frankly for us it has sort of stopped evolving.

We understand the path that we are on now. It is an operational part of our total force, highly integrated into the force. That is where we are today, and we are funding it that way. Both the Army and the Air Force are funding I believe at historic levels for the guard and the reserve in both the Air Force and the Army because of the nature of the role that they now perform as an operational force.

I will let both of the generals comment more on that, but that role has definitely changed here in the last few years.

General Cody.

General CODY. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That has been the strategic issue. In 1989 when the wall came down and we downsized the military, we were a forward-based, forward-deployed, large active duty Army. We had time to go to the guard and reserves if we got into a major fight because we had a lot of active duty soldiers. We had four divisions on the European plains and two corps and two armored cavalry regiments.

Today, we don't have that. We are 482,000-strong in the active force; 350,000, give or take, in the Guard; and 200-some-odd-thousand in the reserves. It takes a total force now. When we downsized the military over the 1990's, we walked into making the guard and reserves an operational reserve.

Mr. THORNBERRY. I guess I would just comment last, I hope we don't think that we have stopped evolving, because within the past month or two, we have had a new mission for the national guard, sending them to the border in a supporting role. It may evolve further next month. The importance of asking those first questions, I think, is not going to change even if we think we are pretty sure about how, if we know how dependent we are today to accomplish today's missions, on the Guard.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could add, Congressman Thornberry, just a comment here. In the Quadrennial Defense Review, the roll-up to that and the report out here to the Congress, we as a group put together a whole series of actions. There are over 100, probably on the order of 125 or so. These are a variety of actions. They could be acquisition; could be about the national guard and the rest. But there are actions about the reserve component in there, national guard and reserve.

In fact, we are out executing these things right now. We have written them into strategic planning guidance. One of the fundamental questions that you have out there is, what is this evolved role of the reserve component, now this strategic and operational reserve? And how do we have to activate, mobilize, train, organize, train and equip? They are very fundamental questions that we have asked in those.

I think you have emphasized that in your opening statement. I would just tell you that these are a fundamental part of our Quadrennial Defense Review actions.

General CORLEY. Sir, if I can add on to that. We try to ask the questions and we continue to ask the questions. In trying to respond to those questions, we want a collaborative approach to provide the responses. You got it right in terms of this path that we are on and what we continue to discover about the path. In the 1980's, we learned that if we were to continue to do the job to de-

defend this nation, we had to be organized, trained, equipped, resourced to a common set of standards.

We moved forward into the 1990's and we discovered that we were going to not only practice together, but we were going to employ to defend this nation together. We find ourselves in the year 2000 as inseparable, and we continue to ask the questions of how do we do this better.

That total force initiative, that directorate which is headed by a guardsman inside of the United States Air Force, is already at the conclusion of phase three. We have already come up with an additional 113 initiatives to move us forward. Questions, and continue to answer those questions as best we can, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Reyes.

Excuse me. The gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. I want to thank all of you gentlemen for your service and for being here.

First of all, we might like to remind the secretary, who I do consider a friend, but the national guard and reserve was very much a part of the first Gulf War, with the 30-something Pennsylvanians who died in those barracks with the Scud missile attack were all guardsmen or reservists. The integration of the force has certainly been ongoing for some time, and I think the real turning point was the first Gulf war, and not something since 2001.

A couple of things, the reluctance on the part of certain people within the DOD to do this, I just don't understand. I think it is fair to say that when the attack on the homeland takes place, and just last week retired General Barry McCaffrey said he saw a 50 percent of that happening within the next 10 years. So when the attack on the homeland takes place, it is going to look a lot like Hurricane Katrina. There's not going to be any electricity. There's not going to be any communications. You will have people who are hungry, people scrounging for food and water.

Quite frankly, I think it is fair to say that the real heroes in the early hours of Katrina were the guard. I will point out some of those heroes were under-equipped. The 898th engineering unit came home in January of 2004. I pointed out to General Myers, I believe I pointed it out to Secretary Rumsfeld in this room, that they had left every stick of equipment they had in Iraq. The day the storm hit, they only had 60 percent of their equipment.

One of the things that we learned the hard way is when something like that happens, you just don't go down to the equipment place and go buy it because everybody else under the sun is trying to buy the same piece of equipment, at an inflated price. You need to have it ahead of time.

Given that some very smart people think the attack on the homeland is going to happen within the next 10 years, that the most likely people to respond to that and who are going to have the skill sets necessary to respond to that in the best way is the guard, I really am taken aback at the reluctance on the part of some high-ranking people within the DOD to give the guard an equal seat at the table.

A year ago, half the force in Iraq or very close to half of the force in Iraq was guard and reserve. They are a part of the team. You

can't get on an airplane without, you can't pick out the guardsmen; you can't pick out the reservists; you can't go on an Army post and pick out the guardsmen and the reservists.

Since they are such a large part of the force, that's an important part of the force, since they are going to be the best when the attack on the homeland comes, Secretary England, I really wish you would reconsider because I will make you this observation. This is going to happen. It is sort of like health care for reservists and guardsmen a year ago. Now, it is a foregone conclusion that they are going to be a part of TRICARE. This is going to happen. I think the sooner it happens, the smarter we as a nation will be.

You are more than welcome to dissuade me about it. I think it is trying to hold back the tide of history just like those who didn't want the commandant of the Marine Corps or the Marines on the Joint Chiefs; fought a losing battle for a long time on something that should have happened a lot sooner.

Secretary ENGLAND. Mr. Taylor, I guess obviously it is a judgment call. It is not a black and white issue. It is a judgment call. Our objective is to optimize the total force. It is a total force. The guard is an integral part of the Army. They are an integral part of the Air Force. They are not a separate service.

In the United States, actually most of our forces at any given time are active forces here in the United States; most of our guard forces here in the United States; most of our reserve here. Our deployments, while people deploy, most of the force is actually in the United States in training or in their rotation before they go overseas.

So you are right, if there is an attack on the United States, I mean, it is a high likelihood guard and reserve will be involved, but also high likelihood the active forces resident here in the United States will be involved. The objective is, how do you get the best total force to meet the full range of contingencies and the full range of demands on the U.S. military? So the U.S. military has to be prepared for this whole spectrum that it faces every single day.

Our objective is how do you get the best organizational structure to do all of those things at any given time? So we look not to optimize the guard, but to optimize the total force and balance it across a wide range of things that may happen in terms of needs to protect and defend the country.

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, just a quick observation.

Mr. Secretary, I hope this isn't a Guard versus regular force thing, but I do want to bring it to your attention, because I know you to be a good guy and I know you to be a problem-solver. About a month ago, I was at Camp Shelby visiting some of those guardsmen General Cody was talking about. General Blum is my witness.

A fine young Oklahoma guardsman, as part of his training, he mentioned to me he was a HUMVEE driver. Now, I remember when the Mississippi Guard went over about a year-and-a-half ago, they had not seen an IED jammer prior to getting to Kuwait. I had asked the question several times: When is this going to get fixed?

In my conversation with that Oklahoma HUMVEE driver who is now in Afghanistan, I asked him how much time he had spent training with IED jammers. He said, "What is that?" So I walked him through what an IED was and he was familiar with that.

And I said, well, there's a gadget that keeps that signal, the detonator from detonating that device and killing you. And you have to put it on your vehicle. It has capabilities. It has good sides and bad sides, but you need to know how it works. He said something vaguely like, "Yes, I heard my sergeant mention it briefly."

That's got to get fixed. We don't need to send one more kid into theater; half of our casualties, including every single funeral that I have been to, has been the result of an IED. And yes, we can't make the world perfectly safe for these guys, but we can take steps as American taxpayers to pay for them and the American military to field these units so that maybe we will attend a few less funerals and we visit a few less kids at Walter Reed.

General CODY. Congressman, I appreciate your passion for our soldiers. All of us have had friends and people that we know hurt by these IEDs and killed by these IEDs. I ran to ground the discussion that you and I had on the Oklahoma Guard soldiers.

I can go anywhere on any training post, I think I relayed to you, and ask a private or a sergeant, and if he doesn't know, then I want to go see the captain and the battalion commander and the brigade commander and find out why they are not getting this down and letting these young soldiers know exactly what the training schedule is and how the training events are going to flow.

It is a leadership issue. It is a leadership issue at the company command level, at the battalion command level, and our trainers that lead, that lead in the training who are actively going through it. As I told you, we don't put any soldiers in harm's way without getting the IED training.

We have been at this for four years. I don't think we were fast enough to begin with, and I stood up the IED task force back in October of 2003. We are still working through that. I wish we were faster and better on some of the TTPs. We will continue to work it, and run to ground, and fix this leadership problem.

One of the things that has caused this, though, I will just say it up front, is in this third and fourth rotation of sourcing. We have had to go to so many different states to cobble together these units. So they are seeing each other for the first time.

By fixing the modular force and by creating the formation standardized active guard and reserve, and keeping the force structure with the end-strength, we will get to a point where these young soldiers are not coming from five different states and meeting their company commander for the first time or their first sergeant for the first time. That to me is part of fixing some of this leadership problem that we have.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could, Congressman Taylor, I would just like to add that I think it is important to note that last summer we put a significant amount of effort into the first of the major national training centers to put this counter-IED training into it as a model to evolve into the rest.

General Meigs, the retired four-star general, is the head of that IED task force. He has spent a huge amount of time, as the deputy and I have, with these other vice chiefs, focusing on this issue, but in particular the two of us sitting here and General Cody, focusing on this to export the training part of this as early up front into the cycle as possible.

Not just for soldiers, not just for Marines, but also for those Air Force truck drivers that are out there, the Navy truck drivers, explosive ordnance disposal, and frankly everybody that we are deploying over there, in addition to the Udairi training range, this two-week training period that we talked about with improvised explosive device training in Kuwait right now as they go into the Iraq theater. This is also for our Afghanistan folks.

So we are working very hard to take the money that you all have put in, in particular in the supplementals, to focus on the training component of this as early in the process as possible.

Mr. HEFLEY [presiding]. Mr. Gibbons.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

To each of you at the table, thank you very much for your presence here today and for your service to our country. It is greatly appreciated.

You know, the national guard has been associated and integrated with our active duty military not for the last 4 decades, but for the last 230 years. Whether it has been a Goldwater-Nichols Act or H.R. 5200, oftentimes we have to bring both sides to a common center, sometimes kicking and screaming, and that is what this is about.

H.R. 5200, gentlemen, is not about creating a separate branch of the service. H.R. 5200 is not about creating a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the national guard. This is about fairness. This is about bringing the national guard to the table in the most critical deliberation and decision processes that affect the national guard.

You know, I have been in this body for ten years. This is not a brand new issue. This is not a rush to judgment. We have been after this issue for every year that I have been on this very seat in this committee since I came to Congress. I have served both on active duty, in the national guard and in the reserves, so I know it from all perspectives.

You know, if you look back at the recent BRAC process, recent round of BRAC process, 37 of the 42 base realignment and closure decisions affecting the Air Force were national guard; 37 out of 42. That is 88 percent, in my simple math, of the 2006 QDR process, or even look at the stand-up of NORTHCOM.

The point is that the national guard does not have a permanent seat at the table for the Department of Defense in some of the most strategic deliberations that we do for the national guard. Elevating the chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star brings a level of credibility to the national guard, but it also brings a level of accountability for the more than 400,000 soldiers and airmen that are under the chief in decision processes.

You know, when I look back at NORTHCOM, Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), European Command (EUCOM), Pacific Command (PACOM), they are all headed by a four-star, whether it is Navy, Air Force. Neither one of those commands have a seat at the table. They are all represented by one of these three people sitting right here. And that would be the same for the national guard, if he were a four-star at the chiefs level.

I look at NORTHCOM, and maybe the question ought to be, to General Corley, what is wrong with having a national guard general officer in charge of NORTHCOM as a four-star?

General CORLEY. Sir, I can tell you what we have done inside of our Air Force.

Mr. GIBBONS. I am just asking a very simple question. The chief of staff you mentioned, who is a national guard officer for NORTHCOM.

General CORLEY. Admiral Giambastiani mentioned he was.

Mr. GIBBONS. Yes, sir. He can never be the commander of NORTHCOM can he, because he doesn't have a four-star billet capability.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could, sir, I don't think that is the case.

Mr. GIBBONS. You think he could be promoted to four-star.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If the president nominates somebody, you can elevate him and I think the Congress would agree that you could elevate him. The fact of the matter here is that by designating specific seats, which typically we try to avoid inside the department, of it has to be this certain service of officer and the rest of it, because of jointness we have gone away from that. What we are looking for is not just the best of breed, but we are looking for the best of show when we go into these different outfits.

Mr. GIBBONS. When was the last time, Admiral, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a recommendation for an Air National Guard, Army National Guard soldier, sailor or airman to be promoted to a four-star level?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. No one has, but I think it is important for you to understand—

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, that is the point. You are telling me about this jointness and integration.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Sir, you could ask the same question about when was the last time we promoted anyone, a reserve officer, to that position? We have lots of reserve officers out there also. I have two reserves sitting behind me who are on the joint staff here. One is reserve and one is national guard. They are full-time. We didn't have them before. We have had them now for about eight or nine years.

Mr. GIBBONS. As I said, Admiral, we are 230 years into this process of integrating the national guard into the active duty forces. It is about time we gave them that recognition and a seat at that deliberation process, not a separate entity, but a seat in the process.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. I think it is important to recognize one thing. I come up here as a combatant commander for three years. When I got there, I had no reserve or national guard officer serving full-time on active duty. Yet in the resourcing area, my deputy resourcer is now an Air Force Reserve officer and my deputy joint trainer is an Army two-star who used to be up here on the reserve forces policy board.

So you are right, things weren't that way, but over the last three years, they are that way.

Mr. GIBBONS. Well, Mr. Chairman, one last observation. H.R. 5200 just merely attempts to bring credibility to the national guard

process and its relationship to the active duty forces, and I think that is why it is critically important that we entertain it.

Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. We have about ten minutes on this vote, and then we have two five-minute votes, so the committee will stand in recess until we can get that finished. Let's hurry back as quickly as we can after those votes.

[Recess.]

Mr. HEFLEY. If the committee will come back to order. We apologize, gentlemen, for you having to just stand around waiting, but you know enough about this place now that this is the way it is. We don't control our own schedule.

I am going to call on Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. See? There is a reward to promptness.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I am not just prompt. It is just that I don't have a vote on the floor. [Laughter.]

Which I wish I did.

Thank you very much, gentlemen, for being here this afternoon. At the onset, I just want to say I represent Guam, a small territory. I know, Mr. Secretary, you have been there and I am sure some of the other gentlemen have as well. We are very, very proud indeed of our national guard and reserve units over there.

I am also interested in the role of what are called active, guard and reserve, or the AGR positions and military technician positions. It seems as we give more responsibility and more missions to the guard, they need increased full-time manpower to plan, prepare and meet those missions.

Can you discuss whether we should be putting more personnel in the guard on to the AGR, or hiring more military technicians? General Cody.

General CODY. Thank you, ma'am.

We are looking at that. Clearly, because of the complexity of the formations that we are now transforming our national guard, where they will have frontline equipment, with all the new sensor systems and the radio systems, as well as frontline weapons systems. The requirement for the AGR and for the full-time technicians will impact positively on the readiness.

So I conducted by first review with the national guard and the reserves on this about six months ago. It is expensive, as you know, but what we think as we settle on a number, and I can't remember the numbers right now because it was a total number, but as we settle on the numbers, we think the payback is less post-mobilization time. So it looks like it is a cost-effective way.

So we are addressing the AGR and the full-time support based upon the fact that the formations will be different and the equipment is going to be much more modern.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General.

Any other comments? I have one other question.

I have taken numerous trips to Iraq. In fact, I was just in Iraq last week. I have learned that many of the national guard units were supplemented by active duty forces where manpower was needed. This we see all the time.

Has the Department of Defense considered building on this model on a more permanent basis? That is, could there be a construct where in peacetime an active duty soldier or soldiers or officers were assigned full-time to a national guard unit?

It seems to me if we are to achieve a fully integrated force, at least exploring such in-breeding would be valuable. If nothing else, active duty service members would be better exposed and better understand the guard, and would also bring their special knowledge and skills into the guard organizations.

General CODY. On the Army side, ma'am, we have had in the last five years several battalion and brigade commanders from the active command guard units, and we have several national guardsmen commanding active components.

Ms. BORDALLO. This is permanent?

General CODY. Yes. I can't remember the number today, but I will take it for the record and get back to you, but we have done that. Now, what is stopping us from going to the next level in terms of adding active duty soldiers to national guard units or vice versa, quite frankly is we are pretty busy right now with all three components, as well as our normal progressions that we have for our soldiers.

So we have looked at in Army modularity adding components together en bloc, like the 42nd infantry division. When we deployed that, it had a reserve unit underneath it. It had an active component unit underneath it. And in fact, in their aviation brigade, it was guard units, reserve units, and active units.

So we take those building blocks and so you could take an MP company from the guard and deploy it underneath an MP brigade or battalion of active, or vice versa, take an active duty company and plug it into a national guard unit.

That is where we are going with modularity. We have not looked at it as an individual. On the individual side, we have looked at battalion and brigade command, and swapping those out.

Ms. BORDALLO. So what you are saying then is that this integration will continue?

General CODY. Yes.

Ms. BORDALLO. And is on a permanent basis?

General CODY. Yes.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Congresswoman Bordallo, I just might mention that we have an awful lot of integration between active and reserve components on joint staffs. We call them joint task force headquarters. We have elements from the reserve component that are embedded, frankly, in active component joint staffs and the like. There is an awful lot of this going on. I won't go into detail here, other than to tell you that this is a pretty common thing.

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, I think the secretary and I were speaking during the break, and he mentioned to me that sometimes you can't tell whether you are talking to a reservist, a guardsman, or an active military serviceman. They are all integrated, and I hope that this will continue because I think this will bring us together.

Thank you very much.

General CORLEY. If I can also add to that, it is right missions, right place, right mix, right numbers. In my opening statement, I talked about an association, if you will, between the 197th and the active Air Force. We also have community basing proposals where we have individual F-16 maintenance personnel assigned up in Burlington, Vermont, up at the 158th Fighter Wing. So continued examples of integration of the right mix, if you will, to move ourselves forward.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Gentlemen, thank you for your service, and the men and women that you represent.

I might pick up for a moment on Colonel Gibbons's line of questioning. I will come back to that with you, Admiral Giambastiani.

Secretary England, the coordination between the guard bureau and the office of the secretary of defense is crucial, but my understanding is there is no direct link on the official seating chart between the guard and the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD).

Clearly, with the Katrina and other civilian-type disasters, you all have had to coordinate very, very closely. Can you describe what that relationship is now and how it possibly could be better if some of the recommendations of H.R. 5200 were followed, if I make myself clear?

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, let me tell you what we have now. We have an assistant secretary for homeland defense, Paul McHale, who is responsible and he has the interface with the national guard bureaus, so they work hand-in-hand at the assistant secretary level. And also, of course, we have NORTHCOM, which is an active combatant commander, and that combatant commander works closely with all the governors and with the national guard and with the reserve and with the active force.

So between those two, they integrate the guard and the active, and again, this is a total force approach. It is not a guard issue. It is a total force, because we utilize a total force interchangeably in almost everything we do.

So we have NORTHCOM for homeland security. They do the integration for the homeland security missions with all the governors and national guard, and the interface is Paul McHale in the office of the secretary of defense, who is responsible for the interface on those issues for the secretary.

So that is how we are latched together, and frankly it works very well. In turn, they are latched together. We have the Department of Homeland Security and with the Homeland Security Council (HSC) on the White House, so it all latches together through NORTHCOM or Paul McHale and the office of the secretary of defense.

Mr. HAYES. Certainly, you all do work well together. I don't want to indicate that you don't, but it would appear, again, that maybe we could get even better. We are using, Admiral, in reference to the two gentlemen, reserve and guard behind him, in coming back from the last vote, Colonel Gibbons said, "I got your six."

Well, that is what the admiral said. Those gentleman got his six, and that's great to have that protected, but every once in a while

it might even make the mission better if they went from the six o'clock to the wing man and possibly occasionally to the point person.

So again, I want to compliment you on moving the process forward, but as Mr. McHale said, the funding of the Army National Guard is usually done in supplemental fashion in Congress. I would like to see that move on up to the normal budgeting process. And then also on the NORTHCOM issue—

Secretary ENGLAND. Pardon me, Congressman, I don't believe that is correct. The national guard, we fund \$35 billion a year, I believe is the number, in our base budget for national guard and reserves. So when you passed the bill this year, in that bill will be like \$35 billion for personnel and equipment for the national guard and reserves. Is that the right number? I just need to make sure I have it right.

General CODY. I don't know the number in OSD. I just know that for the fiscal year 2005 to 2011, in the theater of operations (TOA), or the Army's portion of it, is \$21 billion for national guard equipment, and that is in the base.

Mr. HAYES. Clearly, I probably misstated that. There obviously is a major portion in the budget, but at the same time my understanding is that NORTHCOM has not fully described and articulated the needs particularly for equipment of the national guard, which sort of ensures that we may be a little bit behind time when it comes to re-equipping some of these units that Congressman Taylor referred to.

Just your general comments if that is a correct thought, and if so how we can make sure that the platforms, as we mentioned earlier, and other equipment are updated and provided in a timely fashion for these folks?

General CODY. I will take that, Mr. Secretary.

I probably wasn't clear, Congressman, about homeland security, homeland defense and hurricane season preparedness. Early in September of 2005, I asked the National Guard Lieutenant General Vaughan and the Army staff, as well as U.S. Army Reserve three-star, General Helmley, to take a look before hurricane season even started, because we were simultaneously fighting this war, re-setting our equipment, buying new equipment, and training our force. We also knew we had the hurricane season coming up.

And so they went and worked with the eight states that are most affected by the hurricane season. We started this back in 2005, and took a look at Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, Florida, South Carolina, and came up with 10 essential capabilities that they would need.

And then we looked across there and we said, okay, how can we from active guard and reserve, total Army, get the right equipment to the TAGs in case, based upon what they had right now for on-hand balances, so that if something happens during the hurricane season, we have it, as well as where can we preposition stuff and bring it to the fight if they get hit with a hurricane.

Before the hurricane season started last week, we had over 2,000 trucks moved in, 370 trailers, a bunch of engineer equipment, 570 different pieces of engineer equipment, a total of 11,000 pieces of equipment that we funneled through meeting the requirements of

the TAGs of those states in preparation for the hurricane season. And then we also have additional equipment that we have in our depots that we can divert.

So until we build ourselves out of this \$56 billion equipment hole we started with, we are going to have to be doing that type of stuff while we fight this Global War on Terror, but we have paid close attention to it, and we did it in concert with Northern Command and Army North.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I might, Congressman Hayes, I would just give you one piece of information that I think would be useful.

The deputy has a deputy's advisory working group which he commissioned and I happen to be his co-chair on this, to work the execution of the Quadrennial Defense Review and also build the fiscal year 2008 and an out defense plan. In that body, we have the national guard and the reserve represented full-time. When you say a seat with us to help us, they are there full time.

General Blum, for example, either he or his chief of staff in many cases, who used to work for me on the joint staff, Major General Terry Scherling, either one of them shows up in addition to on many occasions we will have some of these folks in behind me in those meetings.

I think it is important for you to recognize that. That is one forum. Inside the joint requirements oversight committee, we have national guard and/or reserve or both represented routinely, frankly, from the combatant commands, again from those folks on the joint staff and many others.

They are not, if you will, the five voting members, but we have opened this up to the combatant commands, joint forces command, and the rest. I think those are all important factors. There are many others like that, but those are two I think pretty good examples.

General CORLEY. Sir, if I can add one item from six o'clock to wing men to flight lead, our first Air Force commander is the individual that we provide our air forces, our total air forces to Northern Command. Interestingly enough, that same individual grew from being a first Air Force commander to be the deputy of all programs in the Air Force, and now is our new director of the Air National Guard. So he has been in the flight lead position.

Mr. HAYES. I appreciate the comments.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Keep up the good work, men. Go guard.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Snyder.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank all four of you. You all have great reputations in this town and throughout the country and are known as great patriots. No one works harder for the country than the four of you do, and I really appreciate your service.

The hearing was called today to talk about H.R. 5200, the implication being that some people think that there needs to be some changes because of challenges going on with the reserve component. I would like to spend my time in questions to try to get a description just of where we are at today, not ongoing things that are working to change where we are at today, but where we are at today.

General Cody, I want to direct my questions to you just because that is what I do when you are here, General Cody, but because of our concern about the Army National Guard, as you know. The October 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) study that came out about equipment, in which it said that like 16,000 items of equipment were left in Iraq for follow-on units which everyone understands that policy; that we went from 75 percent of the necessary equipment for the guard that was available before the war, down to 34 percent of the equipment in October 2005.

Where is that number at today? Are we still about that same level in terms of the need for equipment? I know in your written statement, you talk about a substantial financial commitment to the fiscal year 2011, so I assume we still have a big gap. Where are we at today? Is that 34 percent still about where we are at? Do you agree with that GAO report?

General CODY. I am not sure, Congressman, if I agree with it or not, because I have not read it. As you know, in my capacity as the vice chief, I am in charge of readiness every day. The readiness of the equipment across all components is steadily increasing, but not going fast enough. That has caused us to go through this pooling for the hurricane season, which I feel will be more than successful.

Dr. SNYDER. Let's move to readiness, then, because that is my next question. Where are we at with regard to the readiness levels of the national guard units in the United States today?

General CODY. Most of those units, depending upon whether they are being reported under the old Cold War structure because they have not transformed, or the new modular form, which is a much more robust, equipment robust reporting requirement. Most of those units are not above a C-3 rating.

Now, having said that, I will be careful here because of the setting, that goes for the entire force that is back here, not just guard. That is the whole I am talking about. So when we talk about this discussion about the bill to make the national guard chief a four-star, let's remember the problem. The problem is we did not fund this. Making him a four-star is an interesting discussion, but from my seat it doesn't solve the issue. We have underfunded this Army and we have underfunded other equipping, I am sure, in the other services.

Dr. SNYDER. General Cody, I am one of the old guys up here, and I am one of those that bellyache whenever I am trying to compare what is going in Iraq to Vietnam. I don't agree with that comparison at all. I think they are just completely different situations. But I am hearing wise people that I trust here in the last few months comparing the state of readiness of the Army today to where we were in the post-Vietnam era, and that scares the hell out of some of us.

General CODY. Let me say this. The units that we have in combat and the units that are next up to go are the best equipped, best led, and certainly the best trained I have seen since I have been in uniform. Now, our re-setting units, which include guard units that we are not going to call on for another four years or five years based upon the rotation model, they right now don't have the equipment needed for a combat mission.

What we are doing is identifying, we have identified 342 line-item pieces of equipment across the TAGs, based upon whether they have forest fire problems or flooding problems or hurricane problems. We are filling those up to the minimum level, and then pooling assets so that we can rapidly bring them in if you have something.

Dr. SNYDER. So the description that you just gave about the readiness level, my comparison to the post-Vietnam period is consistent with what you said a minute ago: If we don't fund things, we are not going to get those readiness levels up where we want to, whether it is the active component or reserve component. Is that a fair statement?

General CODY. That is correct. We are on a glide-path to fix this, but the strategic issue here, quite frankly, is how much do you fund defense? If you believe you are going to be in this Global War on Terror for another 10 to 20 years, which I believe, then we need to take a different approach on what you fund defense with.

Dr. SNYDER. Let me lead to my third question. Again, talking to some of the wise folks in town, and in fairness, or I guess a tribute to you all, a lot of the wise men in town here that I talk to retired military people, so I guess that is part of the job that you have, is that you end up with a lot of wisdom.

But there are some folks that are getting very concerned. My question, General Cody, to you is a what-keeps-you-awake-at-night question. Rather than getting better, that this may be on a glide-path to getting worse; that we may be having a perfect storm occurring of substantial numbers of troops coming back from overseas, from South Korea, from Asia, that we may not have adequate MILCON commitment for the places to train, to stay, families and all that.

We have problems with recruiting still. We have problems with retention, with the equipment thing we have just talked about. All those things are coming together and we may be on a glide-path over the next one or two or three years where the Army really gets in to problems with being a partially broken force.

Now, is that something that keeps you awake at night? Or is that a misstatement or an overstatement of where you think we are or could be if we don't make some changes as we head down the path?

General CODY. If we stay on the path that we are on, I believe that the scenario you just talked about will not happen. I think that the investments and the way we are building our Program Objectives Memorandum (POM), and we are still in that process, and the funding right now in the supplementals has helped us jump-start this and keep our head above water and helped us dig out of some of these equipment holes.

But if we don't stay on that path, this all-volunteer force will be in trouble because as you say we are simultaneously moving the force. We are building MILCON to reposition the force back in post-camps and stations. We are restructuring the force, active, guard and reserve. And those that are coming out of combat are fully equipped and they know what right looks like. If we don't put that same type of investment back to when they return back to

their armories or back to their post-camps and stations, we could be in trouble.

So my hope is we don't go backwards. We need to continue to go forward.

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, General Cody.

Thank you all.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could, let me just talk very quickly two things: rotational forces and expectations. I am not taking exception with what General Cody has said. I just want to make sure that we all understand that as we moved from that more garrison-based force to now these rotational forces that we have, I am used to in my career in the Navy being in a rotational force.

Even if properly funded, the readiness levels in those rotational forces will go down and dip into C-3 and C-4. As you know from your Marine Corps time, when you come back from a rotation, you transfer people. You go on leave. Your training and readiness levels drop down substantially. If properly funded, you will see this tiered readiness and you will have a backup that is planned. If you don't do it properly, then it will be clearly much more severe.

So it is important that we all have the expectation that we should not expect every force inside, either the active or the reserve component, to be C-1 and C-2 readiness levels all the time. It is just not the way it is designed, and frankly I think it would break the bank if we tried to do that.

Dr. SNYDER. I understand what you are saying. I think there are some opinions expressed so that we may not be having the appropriate level where you would like.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your indulgence.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Schwarz.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Allow me, Mr. Secretary, General Cody, Admiral Giambastiani, and General Corley, to free associate for a minute here on the topic of, first, a four-star billet at the table, and the fact that in my day in the service, there was a million-person Army, 700,000-plus in the Navy, 700,000-plus in the Air Force. The Marine Corps was approximately the same size. Those days are over. And now 40 percent of the deployed force are guards-men and-women and reservists.

That being the case, and I have not made up my mind on this bill yet, that is why I am asking the question. What are the flaws and what are the positives in having a four-star guard general at the table, perhaps not a member of the Joint Chiefs, but at the table? And what are the flaws and the positives of having a guard officer as the deputy at NORTHCOM, which in fact if NORTHCOM has to do a whole lot at any given time, that "whole lot" will be done by guards-men and-women and reservists.

So give me the philosophy, the rationale for thinking that this, Mr. Secretary, perhaps yourself, is not a particularly good idea.

Mr. Secretary, you need a good ear, nose and throat doctor, and I know one.

Secretary ENGLAND. Maybe I can get Dr. Snyder to help me. [Laughter.]

Dr. SCHWARZ. Actually, Dr. Snyder is a family practitioner and I am an otolaryngologist. We will handle it one way or another.

Secretary ENGLAND. Thank you.

Congressman, my view, again this is about total force and it is about integration. I actually believe frankly if you have the national guard bureau chief, make him a four-star and put him on the Joint Chiefs, I frankly believe it would have just the opposite effect. I believe it is negative, rather than a positive. I think it is the worst thing you can go to.

What you want to have is an integrated force. The national guard is part of the United States Army, and the national guard is part of the United States Air Force, and you want them to be an integral part of that force. You do not want them to be treated like a separate entity. You want it as highly integrated as you can.

I mean, this is what we try to achieve. We try to achieve as much jointness as we can between the services so that we have interdependency. This would be a move, frankly, to do just the opposite. I believe it is a negative effect, rather than a positive effect. Organizationally, I think it sounds good, but it is not a good integrating approach.

And by the way, I am not sure why anybody is in a rush to go do this. As I said in my opening statement, these are some profound decisions. They all have second-and third-order effects. Invariably, what you try to achieve, you actually achieve a lot of things you are not thinking about at the time it happens. This will have a lot of second-and third-order effects.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Life is a succession of second-and third-order effects, isn't it?

Secretary ENGLAND. Right. A lot of times, you are in plan B and plan C, even though that is not what we had in mind at the time.

So in my judgment, this requires a lot of thoughtful deliberation and think this through before we just start, sort of in the emotion of the times, go make a change like this. I do believe this is a fundamental organizational discussion issue, and I believe it is going to take some thoughtful work. I definitely would not just jump to this conclusion.

My instinct is, after 40 years of watching large organizations and now into my sixth year in government, almost all of it here at the Department of Defense, it is evident to me that what you want to do are find ways to tie things together, not to make them parallel. This sort of thing would make another parallel organization. When you look at it, you now have different organizations at the table, parallel, tied together at the top. That is not what you want. You want these tied together at the hip, not at the top.

It is a judgment call, but I will tell you, I don't think anybody should rush into this. Again, I believe it is more negative than it is positive. I actually do not see the benefits of doing this at all. There are other ways that you can tie organizations together, rather than trying to do it at the top. I believe that is a last resort when we try to do it at the top of the organization.

Dr. SCHWARZ. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.

Mr. HEFLEY. Ms. Davis.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you.

Thank you all for being here.

Perhaps, Mr. Secretary, we can follow up. If there were one or two changes that you would make to tie this together, what would those be? What I am really thinking about, part of the difficulty here is one of communication, and I wanted to ask a few questions regarding that. But what would make a difference, in your view?

Secretary ENGLAND. Okay, I am going to turn this over to the gentleman on my left here, Admiral Giambastiani, because he was joint forces command, and that is exactly what they do. That is, how do you make the joint force more effective. So I am going to have him address that, if I could.

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. If I could spend a couple of moments now building on what Secretary England has talked about from what everyone keeps focusing on as the Joint Chiefs side for a moment. Now, let me jump to a combatant commander, another joint organization here.

Most people forget that all of the reserve and national guard should report their readiness levels through the combatant commander at United States Joint Forces Command. Interestingly enough, that when the national guard is federalized, they are all under the combatant command of United States Joint Forces Command.

They get chopped, in most occasions, that is the military term for a change of operational control or tactical control, to another combatant command. For example, when they go into the Central Command, they are operationally assigned to General Abizaid, even though for combatant command purposes, administratively they are still assigned to Joint Forces Command.

Now, what is the significance of that? There is a significant amount of this from the organize, train and equip side, and the reporting of readiness of all units of the service, guard and reserve organizations. Now, why is that significant?

There are two chains that we work on as mandated by Congress in Title 10. One of them is the organize, train and equip that is done through the services, and that goes to the service components. These service components report in one hat to the chief of the service and the secretary, and in the other hat up through the combatant command.

So a lot of this readiness reporting is done through there. I have spent a significant amount of my three years of time, Congresswoman, working on how to better alert, train, mobilize, and written a number of reports. Action is being taken on them and the rest. But we forget about that chain in the readiness reporting. The deputy and I sit, for example, on a senior readiness oversight group, and we work on this.

Anyway, I don't want to bore you with the rest of it, but that is a chain that is important.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. If we could go back to the former point. What is it about that, though, that would be problematic if everybody was at the table? Wouldn't that make it somewhat easier? Because what troubles me a little bit, and I am open to the issue, is whether or not you would have people at the beginning of the discussion being a more central figure in what happens?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. What I would say to you is that they are at the table. The question is whether we use it effectively or not.

I am going to turn this over to General Cody because he can talk about his reporting chain and how they have to deal with it from the Army, and then Corley from the Air Force.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. And perhaps if you could relate, General, as well. One of the concerns that I heard in California was that with the border issue, that the national guard was not informed and in the planning process in the beginning stages of that. Perhaps that is not necessarily true.

I wish we had everybody at the table here, quite frankly, Mr. Chairman, because I think that having the second panel also being able to respond would be helpful. We have very few members here, and it is too bad that we don't have that opportunity. Is that an issue? When you have something as major as that, why wouldn't people all be informed at the same time?

General CODY. From my time as the operating officer of the Army four years ago, and now as the vice chief, every week we have had the national guard three-star general or two-star with our other components, one Army, resolving and working toward resolving the equipping issue, the training issues, the personnel issues, MILCON issues, joint IED training. You name it, they are at the table.

The issue at hand is that this proposal to make a four-star general violates the broader principle of unity of command. The secretary of the Army, the secretary of the Air Force, the chief of staff of the Air Force, the chief of staff of the Army, all are responsible for the manning, the equipping, the readiness, the training of forces to include mobilized guard units. Those four people on the air side or on the Army side, must integrate and balance all of these capabilities.

For the Army, that means that we have an acquisition process. We have a testing process. We have a training base to produce MOS schools. We have a leader-to-phone program. When you put a four-star in between and start doing that, all of a sudden this thing becomes much harder to handle.

The issue, and I go back to this, we are here today to talk about guard issues. They are a subset of a larger issue, and that is the funding. We would not be having this discussion today about equipment if ten years ago we had equipped. We didn't put the money there. You are not going to solve it by adding a four-star to the table because these three-stars at the table are still saying the same thing, as were other people.

We all know what the problem was and we did the best we could, and we are continuing to do the best we can with the help of Congress on these supplementals, to get ourselves out of this bind we are in on equipment.

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Mr. Chairman, if I may just follow up on that last question. Did the DOD inform national guard leadership about the Southwest mission? Or do you think that that would not have been appropriate if they had done that?

Secretary ENGLAND. Congresswoman, I just don't know. I don't have enough detail about that. I will just have to get back to you on that subject.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 119.]

Ms. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CORLEY. Mr. Chairman, if I can add on to another aspect of the point that General Cody was making. This is a bigger part of a whole. It, in my mind, is better postured for success if we integrate and not separate. I am afraid that if we separate, we have the potential to really create confusion in terms of the advice that is provided.

I think we will wind up with more interoperability problems and not less. It will force us to bypass the collaborative process that we have started to put in place and are continuing to move ourselves forward on.

With regard to input, it is at every level. It is input up front. It is early and it is input continuously inside of our United States Air Force. Almost a half-dozen times initiatives flow through, back and forth, before a decision is rendered. So in my mind, we are moving to a totally collaborative process with the stakeholders in full disclosure, and I think moving away and separating would have some highly negative effects.

Mr. HEFLEY. Ms. Bordallo.

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want a point of clarification. I don't think I am understanding this. Secretary England, you said by giving the guard a four-star position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would place them in a separate position, and we want integration. Isn't this what you said?

Now, are you then saying that the other branches, the Navy, the Air Force, the Army, are separate?

Secretary ENGLAND. Well, they are distinct military services.

Ms. BORDALLO. So what would the difference then be?

Secretary ENGLAND. The national guard is not a military service. It is an integral part of the Army and it is an integral part of the Air Force. I believe you would basically imply it is a separate service if you had them represented that way in the Joint Chiefs. You don't want them represented that way. You wanted them to be an integral part of the Army and the Air Force, and not treated like a distinct military service.

So my judgment is, if you put them as a separate representative member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that would be like treating them as a separate military service, which they are not. I mean, you want them to be an integral part of the Army and the Air Force, not to be viewed as a separate service.

Ms. BORDALLO. So they are a branch of the Army.

Secretary ENGLAND. Yes, they are. They are an integral part. It is part of the Army and it is part of the Air Force, and it is important to take steps to better integrate them in the Army and better integrate them in the Air Force, and not try to do something at the top of the organization.

What you want them is to be totally integrated at every single level throughout the Air Force and the Army, not trying to do something at the very senior level as "fixing" some problem. I mean, that is not the way to work any issue is at the very top, if they integrated every level of every organization. That is, in my judgment, in my experience—

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. That clears it up for me.

Mr. HEFLEY. The committee is going to have to stand in recess again.

And with our thanks to this panel, you are excused. And thank you very much for being here.

We do have a second panel, that if you can wait, hopefully we will get some members back for the second panel after this series of votes.

[Recess.]

Mr. HEFLEY. The committee will come back to order.

We have on this panel Major General Francis Vavala, U.S. Army, adjutant general of Delaware and vice president of the Adjutants General Association of the U.S.; and Brigadier General Stephen Koper, U.S. Air Force, retired, who is president of the National Guard Association of the U.S.

General Vavala, before you begin, let me anticipate a request that I understand that you will make, and that is to have a letter from the National Governors Association in support of H.R. 5200 entered into the hearing record. So, without objection, that letter will be part of the record.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 115.]

Mr. HEFLEY. And, General, you may begin.

I apologize for there not being more members here, and there may be more as we go along, but Mr. Rumsfeld and the secretary of state, Mrs. Rice, are doing a briefing right now in another room, and I suspect that has attracted some of our members.

So, General, if you will begin.

General VAVALA. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And thank you for entering the correspondence into the record.

I would ask that you would allow General Koper to speak first, if that is agreeable.

Mr. HEFLEY. Whatever is all right with you two is all right with me.

**STATEMENT OF BRIG. GEN. STEPHEN M. KOPER, PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL GUARD ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
U.S. AIR FORCE (RET.)**

General KOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The show played very well in Buffalo. We seem to have lost our edge, but—

[Laughter.]

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on issues related to H.R. 5200, the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006.

The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) thanks you for your years of outstanding support to the national guard.

As many of you know, NGAUS was formed in 1878 by former militia officers of both the Union and the Confederacy to seek united representation for the militia before the Congress. They were concerned that the militia, a constitutional pillar of the republic, was being left to languish in disinterest and neglect.

How, they wondered, could forces created by the Founding Fathers and so recently locked in mortal combat in the shadow of their own homes be so consistently shortchanged and dismissed? They were successful in their efforts in bringing Congress to the aid of the militia.

Mr. Chairman, how little times have changed. NGAUS is here today because, as President Bush, the commander in chief of the national guard, said in a major speech in February of this year, "For 128 years, the National Guard Association has been fighting for the citizen soldiers who fight for America."

We, once again, earnestly request your assistance.

Although the guard wasn't at the table during the formulation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, the revelation that the national guard is no longer a strategic reserve but, rather, an operational force, changes the landscape for the foreseeable future as to the level that senior national guard leaders should be involved in Defense Department planning and programming.

Today, the guard is needed more than ever, and the active forces simply can't get the job done without us. Guard members have proven time and again that, if given the right equipment and training, they will perform on an equal basis with their active component comrades.

The total force concept introduced in 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird works, but only if the guard is provided the resources it needs and is treated as a full partner in planning, programming, budgeting and strategy formulation.

If you were to ask almost any senior active Army or Air Force leader why the guard wasn't at the table, they would emphatically reply, "They were at the table." It is now generally conceded in testimony here on the Hill that they were not.

We believe that the Department of Defense is still deeply mired in an institutional bias toward the national guard. Let me give you a contemporary example that seems to reflect this seeming inability to embrace the guard.

A visit to the United States Northern Command public Web site reveals an interesting perspective into how the Department of Defense perceives the mission and capabilities of the national guard. U.S. NORTHCOM's mission definition is "to conduct operations to deter, prevent and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests within the assigned area of responsibility, our borders between Canada and Mexico, and, as directed by the president or secretary of defense, to provide military assistance to civil authorities, including consequent management operations."

Upon closer scrutiny of the Web site, there is no perceptible reference to coordinating their efforts with the national guard. It is also interesting to note that NORTHCOM uses Article I, Section 8, clause 15 of the Constitution to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection and repel invasions as justification for their mission, but, again, no reference at all to the national guard.

This seemingly insignificant oversight highlights a serious lack of leadership perspective that could promote a close working relation-

ship with the states, their governors and the guard. More simply put, if cooperation is our common intent, why not say so?

During the Cold War, the guard was seen as a strategic reserve, in part because the active forces consisted of end-strengths at twice the levels they are today.

Foreseeing then the increased level of forces that would be needed to perform peacekeeping operations and to fight the Global War on Terror was a practical impossibility.

But that was 1989, and today, as DOD recognized in its preface to the 2006 QDR report, they are still encumbered with a Cold War organization and mentality in many aspects of department operations, and that it will seek new and more flexible authorities in budget, finance, acquisition and personnel.

NGAUS believes that same line of thinking should apply to how they interact with the guard on a daily basis. More importantly, engaging in denial is counterproductive. In our view, this situation can no longer be swept under the rug.

We must do all that we can to provide the American people with the most cost-effective defense structure. Certainly, we believe that such structure, in many cases, is the national guard.

DOD announced in late May its opposition to all sections of H.R. 5200 and launched a campaign in Congress to either delay consideration of the legislation by referring it to the Commission on the national guard and reserves or to dismiss the bill completely on the grounds that neither the chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the secretary of defense believes the changes are either necessary or warranted.

Unfortunately, this same dismissive response to the guard reaching out to be heard as strategic-level force structure, policy and funding decisions are being made is the very reason legislation of this nature is so sorely needed.

The fact of the matter is that senior guard leadership has only been involved in Pentagon decision making as an afterthought, requiring the adjutants general, governors, Congress and NGAUS to launch vigorous campaigns to reverse decisions that were made without adequate guard input.

Action by the Senate was necessary to remind the Army of this fact earlier this year. The guard's only goal is to have a seat at the table and a relative voice in the decisions that affect their readiness.

Based on the Pentagon's standard response to these entreaties, the National Guard Empowerment Act has been offered as a means to achieve that level of Defense Department involvement we have earned and deserved.

While the secretary of defense is wont to say, "The war on terror could not be fought without the national guard," clearly, a serious disconnect still exists. NGAUS believes that guard leadership should not be made to wait at the kitchen table for something to eat while the rest of the family is feasting in the dining room.

What the national guard really desires is a culture change at the Pentagon that results in a seat at the table where guard inputs are genuinely considered and subsequently factored into strategy, programming, policy and funding decisions, with a clear understand-

ing of the guard's capabilities and unique force structure and missions.

It is nothing more than demonstrating respect to a force that we depend on to augment our active forces and to protect our homeland.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for your time today, and I will be happy to answer your questions.

[The prepared statement of General Koper can be found in the Appendix on page 96.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.
General.

STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. FRANCIS D. VAVALA, VICE PRESIDENT, ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES, U.S. ARMY (RET.)

General VAVALA. Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, thank you for asking the Adjutants General Association of the United States to testify today.

On behalf of all the adjutants general of the several states and territories, I am proud to represent the Adjutants General Association of the United States and its president, Major General Roger Lemke of Nebraska, who sends his regrets, due to the untimely death of his sister.

We thank each of you for your years of outstanding support to our national guard.

The National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act, H.R. 5200, provides the national guard a stronger voice. It increases its ability to secure essential equipment and elevates the chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star level and, most importantly, provides a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a seat at the table.

We, the adjutants general, ask you to consider the advice of the governors and the adjutants general in your deliberations on this important piece of legislation. It is my deep conviction that a stronger guard means a stronger America.

Never in our history has the national guard been more ready, more reliable, more relevant, more essential and more engaged than it is today. No one can dispute the bravery and the patriotism of our guard men and women who have been protecting our shores from enemies, foreign and domestic, since the Revolution and, certainly, today, in our Global War on Terror.

The national guard provides America a blanket of protection and we do it with great effectiveness and efficiency. I only point to the fact that the national guard budget represents approximately 4.5 percent of the Department of Defense's budget, while we perform anywhere from 25 to 50 percent of the Army and Air Force's mission, dependent on the day.

The total force policy was enacted in the 1970's to ensure that both the active component and the guard were equal partners in national defense. The Air Force initially embraced total force, and by the 1980's, it was Congress who recognized the need for additional airlift and took action to purchase C-130Hs for the Air National Guard, and we in Delaware were on the recipient end of that and beneficiaries of that purchase.

In every conflict and contingency, from Desert Storm to Iraq, the Air National Guard's C-130Hs provided indispensable capability to the warfighter. With Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, we, again, saw these same airplanes and guard crews responding to citizens in need.

What would have happened had Congress and the governors failed to rally behind total force and failed to provide these aircraft to the Air National Guard?

During the mid-1990's, the Army proposed to dramatically reduce Army National Guard end-strength by nearly 50,000. The Army's goal of cutting tens of thousands of troops was successfully overcome, again, by strong opposition from Congress, the adjutants general and our governors.

The total force policy is only as strong as its support. The total force policy is vulnerable when the guard and active component compete for limited resources. I am confident that a chief of the National Guard Bureau, with a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will ensure that the guard receives sufficient resources to maintain its readiness.

Having the chief at the table will ensure that the national guard is properly represented with a voice and resource to meet its ever-growing mission requirements, both in support of homeland defense and the Global War on Terror.

More now than ever, the national guard must be able to perform a full spectrum of capabilities. However, the guard cannot meet both their Federal and state missions without the balance that this legislation would bring.

The 21st century brought new challenges. The Guard was at its highest deployment level ever in Iraq. Those 50,000 militia men and women that I spoke of earlier who were slated to be eliminated 10 years ago were still available to save lives, restore order and begin rebuilding New Orleans and Mississippi after they were devastated by Hurricane Katrina.

Ironically, at the same time, the Army was making orchestrations about new force structure reductions.

Again, the total force concept is under attack. What might have happened had you and our governors not united to save this force structure?

On behalf of all the adjutants general, let me be clear: Our greatest desire is to work within the Department of Defense to achieving the strong, appropriate national guard needed to defeat terrorism and secure our homeland. We believe the act, if enacted, removes some of the uncertainty of state, Federal and national guard relationships.

The Department of Defense should not serve as the sole voice on national defense without input of the national guard. The National Guard Bureau should be given a seat at the table and serve as a conduit between the states and the Department of Defense.

Several recent situations highlight the impact of not having a better-positioned voice for the national guard within the Department of Defense, with the most obvious being the base realignment and closure process in 2005.

The Army included the national guard in the BRAC process from the beginning to end. The Air Force exclusionary process caused

the BRAC commission substantial problems, resulting in the most significant number of reversals in BRAC process history.

Instead of working within the Air National Guard to develop a realignment and closure strategy, the Air Force used a one-size-fits-all approach, which did not consider the differences between the Air National Guard and their active duty.

The BRAC commission spent a majority of its time sorting through convoluted facts, misstatements and inaccuracies. Early involvement by the chief of the National Guard Bureau and the adjutants general would have resulted in a better strategy and ranking process.

Oh, and we are also—we still haven't seen the end of the negative impact of the implementation of BRAC. It still haunts us.

The Department of Defense has now repeated its pattern of closed-door decisions with program budget decisions which recommended cuts of up to 38,000 national guard soldiers and airmen.

In December of 2005, adjutants general began hearing of plans for the Army to significantly reduce Army National Guard force structure. For over a month, attempts to confirm rumors proved fruitless. The chief of the National Guard Bureau is not brought into discussions regarding force structure reductions, so he knew nothing.

A letter from the Adjutants General Association to the secretary of defense in early January went unanswered. The adjutants general listened to the secretary of the Army, Mr. Harvey's press conference in mid-January, with no prior information, and finally learned what the Army had in mind.

These decisions, like the Air Force's BRAC decisions that preceded them, were made without communicating or consulting with the governors, their adjutants general, or even the service secretaries' channel of communication, the National Guard Bureau.

There is another reason the national guard must become more empowered. The Hurricane Katrina response highlighted, again, the dual state-federal mission that is unique to the national guard. Each governor has an important stake in sustaining a strong and relevant national guard within his or her state to assure the safety and security of their citizens.

The only formal advocate for this within the Department of Defense is the chief of the National Guard Bureau. Securing the homeland is undoubtedly the most vital joint mission this nation's military has. Yet, the only component with shared resources, the national guard is not present on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Army National Guard is entering its reset mode. The national guard force level in Iraq is declining. Units are beginning the process of rebuilding, refitting and requalifying for the next call to duty. The equipment situation is marginal, at best.

As you all know, the guard is being called on more frequently and in greater numbers for homeland security. How the national guard emerges from this confluence of resource and equipping issues will directly determine its readiness for the next round in the fight against terrorism.

Again, we, the adjutants general, ask you to support the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act so that the leadership can overcome the myriad of issues facing

the national guard, ensuring our readiness to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and I would be happy to answer any questions that you might have.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Vavala can be found in the Appendix on page 103.]

Mr. HEFLEY. Thank you very much.

Were you two here for the first panel?

General KOPER. Yes, sir.

Mr. HEFLEY. Okay, well, then you heard Secretary England. And I didn't hear a lot of concern about the four-star spot. That looks like that is up for negotiation.

I did hear a lot of concern about the spot on the Joint Chiefs, and Secretary England's reasoning was that we are moving to more jointness, more total force, not less, and that national guard is not a separate branch of the service—you have four separate branches of the service, and this is not a separate branch of the service, and, therefore, they are part of the Army, part of the Air Force and, therefore, should not have a seat, because that just takes away from the jointness.

How would you respond to that?

General VAVALA. Well, Mr. Chairman, I would respond to it by saying that if we felt that we were being adequately represented, I could buy into that. But the reality of our situation is that the Army National Guard is 38 percent of the Army and the Air National Guard is 34 percent of the Air Force, 450,000 great men and women who serve our nation. Yet, we have no seat at the table.

Let me try to illustrate this point with a couple of figures.

Currently, there exists 11 four-star generals in the Army and 11 four-star generals in the Air Force. At the three-star lieutenant general level are 38 lieutenant generals in the Air Force, 53 lieutenant generals in the Army, and just three lieutenant generals in the national guard, which, again, represents 450,000 guard forces, almost 40 percent of the force.

I think we all know, within the military, the number of stars and ranks equals the level of influence. And I think this explains why so many key decisions impacting the guard have been weighed without the substantive input of national guard leaders.

It is kind of reminiscent of our country 230 years ago, and we look at the history and say, "Taxation without representation."

That is how I would respond to that, Mr. Chairman.

General KOPER. Mr. Chairman, you mentioned two items, the seat on the Joint Chiefs and the four-star level. Those are two very important parts of this piece of legislation. I would assume they would be parts of any kind of a related bill that might be considered or actions that might be considered.

I think it is important to note two things. This is really about representation in the competition for scarce resources, very critical, and I think several members, in their earlier questioning of the first panel, brought that situation up, and I think General Cody acknowledged the economic impact.

This is not a new problem. This problem has been discussed before the Congress for years and years and years. I think what we

are after, in having your assistance in some type of legislation, is to codify the relationship.

It is wonderful that we are making great progress, albeit in very small, incremental steps, in integrating at other levels. Integration is wonderful. But I would suggest that without the codification of this very important relationship in law, it would then allow succeeding generations of leaders, all well-intentioned, to wander afield to do pretty much what they felt was appropriate.

We are fighting a war here at home. We are in a war. And people have told us they are going to kill us. And they are not going to kill us in Oslo and London. They are going to kill us in Des Moines and Albuquerque. And we don't have the luxury of time.

So I think we are looking for codification of a relationship that we can work on in the years ahead.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Taylor.

Mr. TAYLOR. Let me thank the gentlemen for being here. I am in agreement with your position.

I happen to represent coastal Mississippi and saw the great work of General Blum. Within a week, we had national guardsmen from every state in the union.

And, quite frankly, I am probably—you know, Chairman Davis is the lead sponsor of this bill. I am probably even more an advocate, a stronger advocate for it than he is, having seen what has happened and what did happen and keeping in mind that half the Mississippi Guard was in Iraq on the day that the storm hit.

I do find some inconsistencies in what the previous panel said. Number one, we are a joint force. If we are just going to be a purple force, then you only need one person at the table. And, yet, we already have an Air Force general there, a Marine Corps general, Navy admiral.

And I am more convinced than ever that there will be an attack on the homeland. General McCaffrey's statements last week were really just one more convincing argument. And I do think that the skills that the national guard bring to the table, the life skills of being a diesel mechanic, an engineer, a school teacher, civil engineer, those things are going to be needed.

And I don't think that whoever has the job that is currently held by Lieutenant General Blum needs to go asking for permission to do something. I think they need to say, "This is what we have, and this is what we need to do, and this is what I understand our capabilities are."

So I really don't have any questions, other than to tell you I am in total agreement with what you are trying to accomplish and offer my help to that extent.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Gibbons.

Mr. GIBBONS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your time here today. It has taken you 3 1/2 hours to get before this committee. Your dedication and perseverance is admired by all of us, and we are glad that you are here.

What troubles me is not just that there are few people on this panel here to hear what you have said and to digest your recommendations, but what troubles me is I look out behind you and

I don't see our active duty counterparts taking the time to sit through your testimony, to hear the other side of the story, to hear the perspective that you gentlemen have to give in this issue.

Thank you for your service. Thank you for your dedication. Thank you for pushing this issue, very important.

You know, I had to laugh—not laugh, but I had to tell myself not to get too overactive, when the previous panel was up here, about my feelings on this and when they said, “Well, the Army National Guard is part of the Army, and, therefore, they are represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” And I almost wanted to stop him in mid-sentence and say, “Yes, and the Marines are part of the Navy, and the Marines are part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff today. So how do you balance those two out?”

But they are not here to answer those questions, so I just throw that out to you.

Before 1947, there was no Air Force. Today, the United States Air Force, created in 1947, is part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But we and the guard have been around since 1776, fighting in every war, integrated to the same calling that our active duty brothers and sisters are.

You ought to have the same ability to make those decisions, to be involved at the table, to be part of the deliberative process about how you integrate with the equipment, the training and the resources necessary today.

I thought you were right on point.

You know, when we talk about the interaction between the national guard and the active duty services, it is through the chief, the chief of the National Guard Bureau. When he comes in, he comes proudly in with the highest rank that we have authored, which is a lieutenant general, three stars. He sits at a table with a group of four-stars.

In the military, everyone has great deference for the person who outranks them, and, you know, you stand up at the end of the day, you salute smartly and say, yes, sir. We will put a smile on this and we will go do with what you have given us, but we really can't make an overwhelming case and make a commanding decision unless you have that authority.

Put that aside. I guess what I wanted to ask, a question, in your view, tell me—and, General Koper, General Vavala, thank you—tell me why you think it is essential to elevate the chief of the National Guard Bureau to a four-star.

General VAVALA. Well, Congressman, thank you.

The only disagreement I would have with what you said is that today General Blum is not seated at the table. He is probably two or three tiers behind, as a three-star, again, because of that unique position.

It is so important—and I think General Koper underscored it in his testimony—it is all about being represented at the table and being able to properly resource our national guard. Regardless of what anybody says, we always have to come back to you, our supporters in Congress, and ask for supplementals to get what we need to get in order to properly resource our national guard.

General KOPER. Congressman Gibbons, I think we are an organization—even though I am retired, I guess you always retain your

allegiance—we are an organization that lives by organizational structure and discipline and an ability to follow orders, and General Vavala has certainly alluded to it.

I must tell you I am at a loss to figure out why we can't make this step over, that, in this particular subject area, rank doesn't matter. It matters everywhere else in the Department of Defense except for the national guard. I am at a loss.

So I will leave it at that.

Mr. GIBBONS. Let me follow up that question, and maybe both you and General Vavala—excuse me, I am sorry if I mispronounce your name.

In your view, is the National Guard Bureau's advocacy of equipment reset among state units receiving the proper attention at DOD?

General VAVALA. I can probably illustrate a point. I was at SOUTHCOM yesterday for a meeting, and we always take the opportunity with our colleagues to speak in executive session with all their adjutants general.

And the adjutant general of Arkansas, Major General Don Morrow, his 39th combat brigade was in Iraq till last year. They are back in reset right now. And the difficulty he is having is in properly training, in that in order for us to adequately resource forces that are going to be deployed, his equipment has been taken out of that brigade and, again, not with his consent, but for a valid reason, to be used in the Global War on Terror.

But his difficulty is how is he going to continue to train this infantry brigade and his illustration was without weapons.

Mr. GIBBONS. So we are back to brooms and wooden guns.

General VAVALA. Yes, sir.

General KOPER. If I might follow on to what General Vavala said, Congressman.

General Blum has testified and made it abundantly clear that the equipping levels in the National Guard are approximately 34 percent. That is the official reported and testified number. He indicates to most folks that he speaks with that the reality may be closer to 20 percent of equipping on those units that have returned.

He is a very passionate leader, and he has told everyone to whom he has presented these numbers, "I am not interested in hearing what is going to happen five years from now, because my dual mission says I have to be ready tonight—tonight."

So from a passionate soldier, I think that is an accurate statement of what the magnitude is of the problem. There is certainly enough blame to go around. We can all accept a part of it. But we are in a dire situation, and, again, if that message doesn't reach out at the highest level, we don't have much of a future.

Mr. GIBBONS. Mr. Chairman, may I just ask one final question, since there are very few of us up here?

As we look at the opportunities for national guard officers to excel to a higher rank, do you feel that they would have a problem finding a deputy commander in chief or something of that nature from the pool of 50 to 75 major general, highly qualified national guard officers?

Do you think that there just aren't enough qualified people out there to be promoted to something of a three-or a four-star level?

General VAVALA. I would say absolutely not, sir. Our personnel stand shoulder to shoulder with any of our contemporaries in the active component and have proven such in our Global War on Terror. And the experience level and the dedication is so impressive. I just feel privileged to serve with these great officers every day, and we certainly would not have trouble finding anybody to fill any billets above the two-star level.

General KOPER. We have done—our association did some independent research. We never like to embarrass our good friends and valuable senior members, but we did a little research on the adjutant general corps, some of who are two-star generals of the line, others who are two-star officers of the adjutant general corps.

All of them are college graduates. About 60 percent of them have advanced degrees. About 20 percent have professional degrees. About 5 percent have post-doctorate degrees. Many of them come from a traditional Guard background and have had distinguished careers in business, community service, a whole wide range of life skills.

It seems to me that using them as an example, we would not have a problem promoting two-star generals, and I think the same could be said of that two-star traditional Guard general officer corps who are serving in various integrated billets, as the earlier panel pointed out.

We have got some pretty talented people.

Mr. GIBBONS. I am sure you have a great wealth of experience, and the resumes of some of those traditional national guard officers would be top tier no matter what organization was looking at one of them for promotion.

Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you, because I know that the hour is late and we have asked these people to stay here for quite a period of time. But I want to thank you for your patience in allowing for General Vavala and General Koper to be here to testify today.

Thank you.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Hayes.

Mr. HAYES. Gentlemen, thank you. And let me identify myself with my seat mate's remarks here, my wing man.

Is Special Forces part of the Army, General Vavala?

General VAVALA. Yes, sir.

Mr. HAYES. How many stars does General Brown have?

General VAVALA. Four. I am being prompted out there, Congressman.

Mr. HAYES. Absolutely. We heard so many times that the national guard is part of the Air Force and part of the Army, and that is great. And it really is sad that maybe they don't want to hear what you all had to say, but your case is obvious. I mean, the weight of the evidence is—I don't know how they are going to get a fair trial when it comes to evaluating this bill.

But we appreciate what you all are doing, and I think you need to focus even more on the fact, in the most competitive city in the world when it comes to resources, all resources come from the taxpayers. They don't come from government. That under-representation, which you really pointed out, with 11-53, 11 and 38 against

three-stars, that is just not an acceptable balance when it comes to equipment.

And all of us who have national guard armories in our districts have been by lately, and the lots are basically empty. And what is there, if it was the Air Force, it would be hangar queens and some of the other things.

But, again, you all have really done a great service to your national guard mates by being here today and sitting through all this.

Are there any questions that would have been helpful, had we been smart enough to ask them, that we might have missed, in your opinion?

General VAVALA. Mr. Hayes, I would offer a question that I have wondered about for quite some time now. I wondered what rigorous exercise has been carried out by the senior DOD leadership to come to the conclusion that the no change is necessary. I mean, and I ask that with the utmost respect.

Mr. HAYES. Well, it would seem that “we have always done it that way” would be the only answer. There were numerous opportunities for them to speak to that, and it was always about jointness, “We are a part of the Army, we are a part of the Air Force, we don’t need that.”

General VAVALA. Sometimes the obvious isn’t quite the obvious. I recall early on in some of the BRAC hearings when the BRAC commissioners went about their work, they asked the Air Force what kind of inputs they had secured from the Department of Homeland Security with respect to that aspect of the Air National Guard’s mission, as they sought to protect what they viewed to be vital resources that needed to be in place to protect this country, and the answer was, “We didn’t talk to them.”

Mr. HAYES. Interestingly, I asked Secretary England, if I remember correctly, why you all weren’t in—I didn’t ask the question directly—why you weren’t at the budget table, and he said, oh, yes, you all were in the budget. But, again, that is for the most basic of supplies and equipment. As you say, when you come home to train, there is nothing in the closet. There is no equipment there.

So, again, I hope you all will continue the fight here. I think you have drummed up a lot of support from folks on this side of the table, and we have got great staff members. But what would the guys that preceded you feel like if they came to a hearing and our staff was behind the microphone asking questions?

Not exactly parallel, but, still, it is sort of the same thing. When we go to theater, who do we fly with? Every time I have been to Afghanistan or Iraq, it was the Air Guard.

You all deserve a seat at the table, and I appreciate the chance to speak up on your behalf, because what you do is absolutely immeasurable. The challenges never cease, and your ability to meet them is always there. And we, again, want to thank you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I would yield either to colonel—would have been a general if he hadn’t—okay. Anyway.

Mr. HEFLEY. Well, thank you, Mr. Hayes.

And thank you two for your testimony.

Let me just say I thought Secretary England’s argument about a seat on the Joint Chiefs of Staff was pretty compelling, except I think it breaks down in consistency in one place.

And if you will look at the placards on the back of the wall, you have got the Department of the Air Force, you have got the Department of the Navy, you have got the Department of the Army, and then you have—wait a minute. That is the Department of the Navy, and in small letters underneath it is United States Marine Corps.

In other words, they already have a member of the Joint Chiefs who is not a separate branch service. It is a part of the Department of the Navy.

So it certainly would seem reasonable, if you were in a court of law and you are looking for precedent, it would seem reasonable that we have a precedent already. If there is a value in having the National Guard Bureau as a member of the Joint Chiefs, we have a precedent for it, because they have already done it with the Marine Corps.

Would you like to comment on that?

General VAVALA. Yes, sir. In fact, that was an illustration that we considered making today. Again, we didn't want to take anything away from the Marine Corps, per se, but it certainly supports the argument that we are making relative to this bill.

Mr. HEFLEY. Mr. Hayes, did you intend to introduce your bill to take the Marine Corps out of the Joint Chiefs?

With that, we thank you gentlemen very much, and thank you, as has already been expressed, for your service.

And the committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

JUNE 13, 2006

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 13, 2006

Opening Remarks – Chairman Duncan Hunter
HASC Full Committee Hearing
National Guard Bureau Reform
June 13, 2006

This hearing is the result of a commitment I made during the committee's mark-up in May of the "G. V. 'Sonny' Montgomery National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007." Then, the committee decided to defer action on H.R. 5200, the "National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006, by asking the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves to report not later than March 1, 2007, on the advisability and feasibility of implementing H.R. 5200.

During the discussion of H.R. 5200 in committee, Members made clear their strong interest in an oversight effort to address problems and issues with the current system for structuring, equipping, manning, training and resourcing the National Guard, not only for missions conducted in accordance with title 10, United States Code,

under the control of the Secretary of Defense and the combatant commanders, but also for operations conducted by the National Guard, in accordance with title 32, United States Code, under the control of the governor of a state. This hearing is part of that committee oversight effort to define and examine the issues and problems tied to National Guard – Department of Defense relationships and the national defense and homeland defense missions they carry out.

We have two exceptional panels of witnesses today who are well qualified to help us begin to understand the challenges for improving the ability of the National Guard to meet the requirements of its federal and state missions.

Before I introduce our first panel, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Ike Skelton for any remarks he wishes to make.

INTRODUCE PANEL 1

**Honorable Gordon R. England
Deputy Secretary of Defense**

**Admiral Edmund P. Giambastiani, U.S. Navy
Vice Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff**

**General Richard Cody, U.S. Army
Vice Chief of Staff
Department of the Army**

**General John D.W. Corley, U.S. Air Force
Vice Chief of Staff
Department of the Air Force**

INTRODUCE PANEL 2

**Major General Francis D. Vavala , U.S. Army
Adjutant General, Delaware, and
Vice President
Adjutants General Association of the U.S.**

**Brigadier General Stephen M. Koper, U.S. Air Force (ret.)
President
National Guard Association of the U.S.**

General Vavala, before you begin, let me anticipate a request I understand that you will make – that is, to have a letter from the National Governors Association in support of

H.R. 5200 entered into the hearing record. So without objection, that letter will be part of the record.

General, you may begin.

**OPENING STATEMENT FOR THE HONORABLE IKE
SKELTON
FULL COMMITTEE HEARING ON NATIONAL GUARD
BUREAU REFORMS AND HR 5200
JUNE 13, 2006**

Thank you, Mr. Chairman

Thanks also, to the witnesses here before us. Gentlemen, you each have distinguished yourself in national service a hundred times over. We cannot ever adequately thank you for that, but we can recognize it, and let me assure you that we do.

This is a timely hearing. The combat units of the Army National Guard, which have acquitted themselves so tremendously in their service since 9-11, are nearly exhausted. Where once they provided a large percentage of our forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, they now provide only a few. We've used them up, and when they're gone, they won't be available for many years.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review was a surprise to many of us. It was then we realized the full extent of the Department of Defense's designs on the Guard. The QDR called for a 17,000 man cut in the force over time. Soon thereafter, the Army was here to declare that they were not going to fully fund the Guard's endstrength. It was only through the action of this Committee that we will continue to pay for the full 348,000 man endstrength this year.

But, as my friend Gene Taylor from Mississippi knows better than most, the role of the Guard is not just national defense. The Guard's response to Katrina was heroic but nobody would argue that they were fully equipped or fully manned for the job. Katrina caught some Gulf-state units deployed, it caught others under equipped because of their recent deployments, and it exposed other weaknesses.

This hearing today begins the process of looking at the National Guard, and how it is organized, trained and equipped to meet the demands of the 21st century. HR 5200 is a bold step to try to deal with some of

those challenges. While it offers some intriguing approaches to some of the perceived problems, it would fundamentally change the way the Guard fits into our national and homeland defense architecture.

These questions, and others, were exactly the sort of thing this Committee had in mind when we created the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves in last year's bill. And that's exactly why we've asked them to look at the advisability and feasibility of implementing H.R. 5200 in this year's bill. They have the resident expertise and the resources to fully investigate these issues, and I look forward to hearing their report on the matter.

Until the Commission does report, however, it is entirely consistent with this Committee's oversight function that we take this opportunity to explore some of the challenges facing the Guard today.

Fundamental change may be warranted, but we must approach this process cautiously. We need to fully understand the challenges facing

the Guard. We must define the problems precisely and explore all the implications of the proposed solutions to those problems. This has the potential to significantly alter the way the Department of Defense provides for our national security, how both the DoD and Department of Homeland Security provide for our domestic security and how able the National Guard is to respond to their own State command and control apparatus in times of domestic crisis, such as natural disasters. When Congress last looked at changes of this magnitude, we studied them over several years. We held multiple hearings and detailed briefings. What finally emerged as Goldwater-Nichols was years in the making. We got it basically right in the end because we took the time up front to do it right at the beginning. We should all keep that in mind.

With that said, then, I look forward to today's testimony. I would like to hear your perspectives on the strengths and weaknesses of the systems in place for structuring, manning, equipping and training the Guard, and how we might improve upon it in the future. Your insight will be

valuable to us as we determine the best way to move forward in these matters.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

**Statement for the Record
The Honorable Gordon R. England
Deputy Secretary of Defense
House Armed Services Committee
National Guard
June 13, 2006**

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, Members of the Committee - Good afternoon.

Many thanks for the opportunity to appear before your Committee to discuss this important topic. Thanks also to this Committee for your continuing strong support for our men and women in uniform, who make sacrifices every day to defend the freedom and liberty we all so enjoy. Secretary Rumsfeld and I are deeply grateful to them and their families for their service and their sacrifices, and we are grateful to you for supporting them.

I'm pleased to appear before you today with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ADM Giambastiani, Vice Chief of Staff of the Army GEN Cody, and Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen Corley to talk about a critical part of the Department's Total Force - the National Guard. I'd like to start the discussion by putting this topic in context: namely, where the Department has been, where we are headed, and the integral role of the Guard. Then I'll make a few suggestions about how we might continue to work together to improve the total force.

I. New requirements after the end of the Cold War, and 9/11, left the Department with some shortfalls.

In the 21st century, in the aftermath of both the Cold War and 9/11, America faces a new global security context. In the long war on terror, our Nation confronts a much wider array of asymmetric and irregular challenges than ever before. Terrorists seek to destroy the very way of life of America and our friends and allies, and they will stop at nothing to achieve their ends. At the same time, traditional state-based threats have not gone away. Hostile states could acquire and use weapons of mass destruction, to devastating effect.

The current long war is different from the wars of the past. We are no longer likely to suffer tens of thousands of casualties in a single, conventional battle, as we did during WWII. But the US could face that same magnitude of loss in an attack on the homeland.

In 2001, the new Administration inherited a military force that was still configured for the exigencies of the Cold War era. Secretary Rumsfeld and the rest of the Department's new leadership recognized that the new era required new approaches. The world had changed, and the Department had gaps to fill - notably, for irregular warfare and homeland defense. A shift of focus was required.

II. Transformation, launched by the new Administration in 2001, has already achieved concrete results, and continues apace.

Based on the assessment of shortfalls, the Department launched an aggressive process of transformation, to update and reorient both capabilities and processes to meet a broader array of challenges than ever before. That process is not a singular activity; rather, it is an evolutionary continuum that has already achieved many results.

Transformation has included many organizational reforms – both outside and inside the Department. Most notable on the national scale, in the wake of 9/11, was the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security by the US Congress. Most notable inside the Department of Defense was the creation of a new Combatant Command, US NORTHCOM. While these were positive steps, they added integration complexity. Efforts are continuing to bring about full unity of effort with and among the local, state and federal levels of government, agencies here in Washington, and our own Department of Defense.

III. The National Guard is an integral, inseparable part of the transformation of the total joint force.

The National Guard is an inseparable component of the Department's transformation process. In today's environment, the role of the National Guard, at home and abroad, as part of the total force, is essential and increasing. As part of the deployed joint force, the National Guard is fully integrated with their active component counterparts in countries around the world. The Department's June 2005 Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support placed further "focused reliance" on the National Guard to work with their active counterparts to protect and defend the homeland.

Transformation requires assessing and updating how the Guard, as part of the total force, is structured and resourced. The Government's past track record with the National Guard did leave room for improvement. In the past, the Guard was not always fully resourced. Limited procurement in the 1990's had an impact on all of the Nation's military forces, including the National Guard. The Guard has also not always been fully included in decision-making that affected their organization and membership.

Changes launched in the past few years have put the Department firmly on the path of improvement. My colleagues from the Army and the Air Force can speak in more detail about specific recent resourcing and organizational initiatives in their Services. Recognize that the process of achieving solutions is both complex and continual.

For the Department as a whole, many transformation initiatives coalesced in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review. The QDR introduced specific initiatives to update the Department's capabilities for meeting a full spectrum of challenges – from traditional threats to terrorism. The QDR also tackled how the Department can best make use of its Total Force - the active component, the reserve component, civilians, and contractors. The QDR strategic vision includes utilizing the Reserve Component as an operational as well as a strategic reserve, and rebalancing certain skills between the active and reserve components. The QDR also points to

the need to adjust the authorities and rotation policies that govern the use of the Reserve Component, in order to provide a greater degree of deployment predictability to those who serve. The National Guard is an integral part of every aspect of the QDR's strategic vision in terms of both capabilities and processes.

This year, recent legislative changes allowed the Department, for the first time, to submit the QDR to Congress together with this year's budget request. This timing allowed a few "leading edge" measures from the QDR to be included in the FY07 budget. However, the QDR's transformative vision will be much more fully realized next year, in FY08.

IV. A major remaining transformation issue is getting the relationships right, including fully integrating the Guard into the Total Force.

At the decision-making level, the Department created an inclusive and effective new governance mechanism for the QDR process. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and I co-chaired a body of senior civilian and military leaders, including the Under-Secretaries and Service Vice Chiefs of Staff, which met frequently to debate and resolve issues. The Department is keeping that body in place – it's now called the Deputy's Advisory Working Group - to oversee QDR implementation and to help adjudicate organizational and investment priorities and decisions. Throughout the QDR process, the National Guard Bureau has participated in that forum.

The QDR's vision for reforming the defense enterprise also includes better horizontal integration at all levels, not just among the senior-most leadership. This includes ways to better integrate Guard personnel on the Army and Air Staffs, thereby making sure that the Guard has full visibility on strategic decisions that affect the total joint force. There is a parallel on the civilian side - the designated "manpower and reserve affairs" positions in Service Secretariats. Transparency and inclusiveness in the decision-making process are the best possible ways to strengthen trust and confidence across the board.

The Department values and recognizes the need for close cooperation between the federal and state levels. The Department is committed to making sure that TAGs are included in key future discussions like those about the future force. Governors, too, have a role to play in the consultation process – as Secretary Rumsfeld told a session of the National Governors Association earlier this year.

V. Arriving at the best solutions will take time.

There is still a great deal of work ahead, to determine the best approaches and how to implement them. It is very important that we take the time to make the best decisions regarding organizations, command relationships and decision-making processes. This kind of effort is complex and will take some time to develop.

The last time Congress passed legislation changing the make-up of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was in 1986, with the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Developing that legislation was a very deliberate process. It began in 1982, when the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force General

David Jones, wrote an article, "Why the Joint Chiefs of Staff Must Change". The Chief of Staff of the Army, Edward "Shy" Meyer, supported the article and added new proposals of his own.

It was this very Committee, the House Armed Services Committee, that took on the challenge that same year – 1982 - and began to hold hearings. Chairman Hunter and Representative Skelton could tell the story better than I can, because they were serving on the Committee at the time. The hearings began, staffers carried out studies, the Department provided assessments, and key think-tanks – including the Center for Strategic and International Studies – produced valuable input. In 1986, Congress passed Goldwater-Nichols – nearly 5 years after the debates began.

Prior legislative changes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff had taken even longer. In 1978, an Amendment to the 1947 National Security Act welcomed the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a full member of the JCS. This was the culmination of a process that had begun in 1952, with an Amendment that gave the Commandant co-equal status on the Joint Chiefs of Staff for Marine Corps issues. It took 16 years to upgrade the Commandant's status.

Today, we face another set of organizational questions. This time, the Nation is seeking the best structures and processes to better integrate the National Guard into the Total Force. Arriving at the right solutions need not take 16 years – or even 5 – but a hasty decision would not be the right decision.

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves has already made a strong start. Their initial 90-day Report, including 7 initial findings, shows great promise. The Department welcomes and encourages their effort, and remains ready to continue to facilitate their year-long study.

Coincidentally, the Commission's analytical work, and the Department's incorporation of the QDR's vision for change into the FY08 budget, will come to fruition at about the same time. Secretary Rumsfeld and I recommend that the Congress and the Department allow the Commission time to complete its work, consult with experts and develop clear recommendations, with a view to reconvening and taking action at that time, likely in the spring of next year.


Secretary Rumsfeld and I do appreciate the opportunity to work closely with this Committee on these issues in days to come. Thank you again for your partnership in these efforts, and for your support for our courageous men and women in uniform.

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Committee

**STATEMENT OF
ADMIRAL E. P. GIAMBASTIANI, JR., USN
VICE CHAIRMAN OF THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF**

**BEFORE THE 109TH CONGRESS
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE**

13 June 2006



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House Armed Services
Committee

Chairman Hunter, Representative Skelton, distinguished members of the Committee; it is my pleasure to testify today on the contributions made by the National Guard and Reserve and the challenges we face in fully integrating them and their requirements into the organize, train and equip processes of the Military Departments. First though, on behalf of the Joint Force, in both the Active Component and the Reserve Components, thank you for your continued bipartisan support. That support has been exemplified this past year by Congressional visits to our troops in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the world; visits to those hospitalized; your funding for operations; your support of transformation and recapitalization initiatives; and the improved pay and benefits you have provided to our Service members and their families.

As we consider recommended changes in policy, law, regulation and practice to ensure that the National Guard and Reserves are organized, trained, equipped, compensated and supported to best meet the national security requirements of the United States, I reflect back on years of joint experience working with the National Guard and Reserves. In fact, my first assignment after commissioning was as the Executive Officer of a Naval Reserve Training Center in Whitestone, New York, as an Ensign. Much later, I gained further experience working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. As Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, I was deeply involved in Reserve Component resourcing for Operations Enduring Freedom, Noble Eagle and Iraqi Freedom and in the Lessons Learned by the National Guard and Reserve Component in Major Combat Operations, the Global War on Terror. As the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I have worked extensively on National Guard and Reserve issues from resource, policy and operational perspectives, including the response to Hurricane Katrina. Throughout these events, the capabilities, dedication, skill sets and patriotism of our Reservists and National Guard men and women have stood out. I have come to know

and work closely with the leaders of our Reserve Components on important issues. And, most rewardingly, I have been privileged to visit National Guard units and meet individual Reservists and National Guard men and women in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq – and in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. I can report what you already know – that they are doing a magnificent job and are an amazing asset to the Nation.

I highlight my personal experience in working on Reserve Components issues both to emphasize my personal commitment to the Reserve Components' essential role in the Total Joint Force and as a metric of how the Reserve Components have transformed from a Cold War strategic reserve to a much more demanding role as both an operational and strategic reserve, deeply involved in operations around the world and at home in support of the National Defense Strategy. The National Guard and Reserve provide key capabilities to the Joint Force and are indispensable to our overall "capacity" to flex to meet crises at home and abroad as well as meet the steady state needs of our Refined Force Planning Construct, as discussed in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review.

We should all be familiar with the responsiveness, flexibility and dedication of the National Guard.

- Within hours of the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center, 1,500 New York National Guard troops reported for duty. This number grew to 8000 within 24 hours of the attacks supporting New York State's security needs. Over 200 Air National Guard aircraft immediately took to the skies to thwart any follow-on attacks, provide air refueling support or transport vital equipment and personnel. At the request of

the President, state Governors temporarily supplemented the security of the nation's airports with National Guard personnel. Their missions encompassed over 400 airports in 52 states and territories.

- Over 290,000 Guardsman have been mobilized in support of Operations Noble Eagle/ Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom. They have fought side by side with their active component brothers-in-arms in foxholes and cockpits with equal honor and courage. They have also brought unique skills from their civilian careers to the challenges they found in Iraq and Afghanistan for which typical military training had no ready answers.
- Our Guard and Reserve Airmen are a vital part of the Air Force Expeditionary team. Over 25% of all Airmen deployed steady-state are members of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve.
- Many returned home from overseas deployments just in time to join with 50,000 other Guardsman responding to Hurricane Katrina; the largest and fastest domestic deployment since World War II. Across the United States, whenever there is a natural or manmade disaster, more likely than not, a Governor will call out the National Guard to respond.
- Most recently, the President has requested the presence of 6000 Guardsman on our Southwest Border to support Border Patrol agents.

All of this speaks to the remarkable capability and capacity present in the National Guard and Reserve.

As the role of the National Guard and Reserve has changed to fulfill both a strategic and an operational reserve, we should not be surprised that the resources, processes, authorities and policies devised in the Cold War for a "mobilization-centric" force should prove less than

optimal for sizing, equipping, recruiting and retaining the National Guard and Reserve today. Furthermore, the National Guard and Reserve suffered from the same long term lack of procurement that affected the military as a whole, which we have been addressing, with your help, since 2001.

Congress has been diligent in pointing out many of these problems, including: equipment shortfalls; failure to fully consider all of the National Guard and Reserve in resource deliberations, including the Base Realignment and Closure process; and command and control challenges during national catastrophes such as Hurricane Katrina.

We are working hard to address these issues with the authority that we possess within the Department of Defense. All components of the Army and Marine Corp have significant amounts of equipment awaiting reconstitution through the supplemental funding Congress has approved. This supplemental funding has proven critical to our efforts both at home and abroad. Since 9/11, the American public has invested over \$10 billion in Guard and Reserve equipment.

The FY 2007 budget requests \$2.7 billion for new National Guard and Reserve equipment, including armored HUMVEES, Stryker vehicles, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems and missiles and other munitions. To ensure the Army National Guard has the funding to support an endstrength of 350,000 in FY07, we are working with Congressional oversight committees to realign \$470 million from the active Army to the National Guard. In all, the Department plans to invest over \$19 billion for new National Guard equipment over the FY 2006-2011 time period, including capabilities to be more relevant for homeland defense and natural disasters, such as an interoperable communications package.

To address the Guard's involvement in strategic resource decision making, the Army established a task force to work with the Guard and 12 State Adjutants General to develop and resource the right mix of roles and missions for the Guard modular Brigade Combat Teams. The Air Force has established a Total Force Integration process that is inclusive and transparent. As an example of the front line role of the Air National Guard in the Total Force, the first squadron to be outfitted with F-22s is associated with the Air National Guard.

Furthermore, the Quadrennial Defense Review declares that the Reserve Components must be operationalized so that selected reservists and units are more accessible and more readily available than today. The Strategic Planning Guidance promotes the development of a sustainable and affordable Total Force of Active Component, Reserve Components, civilians and contractor personnel. Both documents point to changes needed in policy and legislation to effect the ever-greater integration of the Active, Guard and Reserve Components of the Total Force, building on work that included a study on reforming reserve mobilization policies and procedures conducted by U.S. Joint Forces Command.

In this context, the establishment of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves is an essential step in helping all of us work out together how to achieve this greater integration. The Commission is set fair to make a significant contribution to this discussion. I have closely reviewed the seven initial findings in the Commission's 90 day report and agree with them. Many of them are included, in some form, in the Quadrennial Defense Review and the FY 2007 Budget.

In conclusion, I thank this Committee and Congress for your support for the National Guard and Reserve as a strategic and operational reserve of the Total Force and I look forward to working with you to improve our ability to more fully integrate the National Guard and Reserve into the Total Force.

I look forward to taking your questions.

STATEMENT BY

GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF
UNITED STATES ARMY

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SECOND SESSION, 109TH CONGRESS

13 JUNE 2006

NOT FOR PUBLICATION
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

STATEMENT BY
GENERAL RICHARD A. CODY
VICE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMY

Mr. Chairman, Representative Skelton, and distinguished Members of the Committee, thank you for this opportunity to speak to you today about the Army and specifically the Army National Guard. On behalf of our Secretary, Dr. Francis Harvey, our Chief of Staff, General Pete Schoomaker, and the approximately one million Active, Guard, and Reserve Soldiers that comprise the Army – more than 120,000 of whom are serving in harm's way in Afghanistan and Iraq – let me offer a sincere “thank you” for your untiring efforts to ensure that Soldiers have the essential resources they need to prevail in the war against terrorism.

The Army National Guard is an essential and integral component of the Army in the Joint and Interagency efforts to win the Global War on Terror, secure the homeland, and provide disaster relief at home and abroad. Since 9/11, Army Guardsmen have comprised over 170,000 of the more than 650,000 Soldiers who have deployed to combat terrorism in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the past five years, over 40,000 Army Guardsmen have been part of the nationwide effort to secure the homeland. And last year, over 50,000 Army Guardsmen – along with more than 10,000 active duty and Army Reserve Soldiers and Army Civilians – rapidly responded to assist their fellow citizens during Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and subsequent recovery efforts.

During the Cold War, the Army's Reserve Components were – by design – principally elements of the Nation's strategic reserve. As such, they were organized and resourced at lower levels than most Active Component units because there would be time available to reorganize, equip, and train them prior to their deployment into combat. Due to the significant reduction of the active Army from its Cold War strength of over

780,000 to its current strength of less than half-a-million and the increased force requirements of the post-9/11 environment, the role of the Army's Reserve Components has changed. By necessity, the Army's Reserve Components have become an operational reserve with – in the case of the Army National Guard – concurrent state mission responsibilities. This change from strategic to operational reserve has necessitated a change in the way the Army National Guard is organized and resourced. Today's environment requires that all units be maintained at a high state of combat readiness, prepared to rapidly deploy as part of the total force.

Following 9/11, the Army began its most significant reorganization since World War II to ensure that the formations of all our components – Active, Guard, and Reserve – were fully manned, equipped, and trained to meet their operational and domestic mission responsibilities. The Army has adopted standardized, brigade-based, Modular Force formations in all components to facilitate interoperability. We are rebalancing the types of units and Soldiers in all our components to ensure we have the right types of units and skills in greatest demand – infantry, engineer, military police, military intelligence, special operations forces, chemical, civil affairs, and psychological operations. And, we've implemented a cyclic Army Force Generation model (ARFORGEN) to manage force availability and synchronize the preparation of all Army forces.

As part of this comprehensive, Army-wide reorganization, the Army National Guard is restructuring to increase its capabilities and effectiveness. The goal of the ongoing restructure is to reduce excess, non-operational forces, create an Army National Guard personnel training account, facilitate a higher level of manning in all Army National Guard formations, achieve the required operational force structure for the Nation, and increase domestic mission capabilities available to the states without decreasing existing endstrength or capabilities within the individual states.

The ongoing force structure decision is a collaborative process that includes the Army Staff, the National Guard Bureau, and the Force Structure Committee of the Adjutants General Association of the United States.

Prior to 9/11, many of our units, including those within our Reserve Components, were inadequately manned and equipped due to years of insufficient resourcing. To make these units combat ready, we had to pool personnel and equipment from across the force to make them whole before they deployed. Given the Army National Guard's new role of operational reserve and first-responder for homeland defense and civil support, the Army is committed to resourcing them appropriately, and has fenced \$21 billion for Army National Guard procurement in fiscal years (FY) 2005 through 2011 – a four-fold increase over the FY03 to FY09 period. The Army and Army National Guard staffs have worked together to identify and prioritize the baseline equipment set required for domestic missions. Additionally, the Army, Army National Guard, and Army Reserve staffs have collaboratively developed equipping plans to accelerate over 11,000 items of equipment required by the eight most critical states for the impending hurricane season.

The realities of the post-9/11 security environment have resulted in an unprecedented level of Army National Guard integration. The Army is incapable of generating and sustaining the forces required to wage the Global War on Terror and fulfill other operational requirements without all its components – Active, Guard, and Reserve. The Army is committed to “total force integration” and inclusion of the National Guard leadership in decisions that impact the structure, manning, training, and resourcing of the Army National Guard and its ability to fulfill its operational reserve and domestic mission responsibilities. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the Director of the Army National Guard have direct access to the

Secretary and Chief of Staff of the Army to provide input or raise concerns regarding issues they believe affect the Army National Guard. The Army National Guard leadership are critical participants in the Army's key, cyclic meetings – such as the Army Campaign Plan, Army Resource and Requirement Board, Army Requirements Oversight Council, Army System Acquisition Review Council, Army Modular Force General Officer Steering Committee, Army Equipping Conference, and Senior Review Group – that address requirements and synchronize resources for all Army components. While this integrated approach has proven very effective during the Global War on Terror at ensuring that the formations of all components have the necessary Soldiers, leaders, equipment, and training prior to deploying in harm's way, we continue to examine ways to improve this process. I look forward to working with this Committee, the Congress, State leadership, and the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves as we examine ways to best ensure “total force integration.”

Let me close by assuring you that the Soldiers of all our components continue to serve magnificently as we engage in the fifth year of the war on terrorism. They continue to distinguish themselves with tremendous acts of courage and valor in places like Baghdad, Ramadi, Mosul, and Khandahar. They understand that we are waging a long war and they believe in their mission. Their commitment and willingness to sacrifice all so that others can live in freedom personify our Nation's highest ideals. Our Nation must remain equally committed to them by providing the resources they need to succeed in their mission. With your continued support and the support of the American people, I know they will succeed.



**Written Testimony
Guard Reform (HR 5200)
General John D.W. Corley**



Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the House Armed Services Committee, as we move into the 21st century, the United States Air Force faces increasing modernization and recapitalization challenges, an adversary increasingly hard to define, and budgetary pressures. The nation's air dominance cannot be assumed. While we possess weapons systems to meet today's challenges and are investing in cutting-edge technology and highly capable, highly trained personnel, we must make transformational changes to maximize the capability these advances give us. One way we will do this is through Total Force Integration.

Total Force Integration calls for increased integration between Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve—sharing all our missions. Our Total Force is dedicated to working as a team to achieve our number one priority of winning the Global War on Terror. To make increased integration a reality we plan to minimize Guard and Reserve end-strength reductions, modestly reduce our AD end-strength and selectively divest some of our older weapon systems across the Total Force. Personnel and divestiture savings will aid our modernization and recapitalization efforts.

The Department of the Air Force has worked carefully to ensure that all the stakeholders in the Total Force effort have worked in a collaborative manner

and have received full information sharing. All parties, including those of the Air National Guard, have been fully integrated into the decision making process including program and budgetary issues. All the members of the Total Force have missions across the spectrum of Air Force operations including our new and emerging missions such as operating the Predator Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV). The resourcing and readiness of Air National Guard units is imperative to the Total Force Initiatives and our procurement strategy reflects this commitment. In fact, some of our Guardsmen are flying our newest Air Dominance fighter, the F-22A. Throughout this process, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau remains our conduit to the Adjutants General and will remain vital to our Total Force efforts.

Led by the Directorate of Total Force Integration (AF/A8F) the Air Force, through new Force Structure focused on programs, forces and technology, and new Organizational Constructs that fundamentally improve the effectiveness of our Active Duty, Guard and Reserve people and systems, will improve its overall combat capabilities and continue to be a primary enabler in joint operations. In January, GAO released their final report entitled "DEFENSE MANAGEMENT: Fully Developed Management Framework Needed to Guide Air Force Future Total Force Efforts". Results of the GAO review were somewhat complimentary in acknowledging the Air Force use of an iterative process, periodic reviews and oversight by senior-level DoD and Air Force officials, and use of a complex process of modeling and analysis. While acknowledging progress in defining new missions for the ANG and testing ways to integrate Active, Guard and

Reserve components, the GAO report cited an incomplete plan to evaluate transformation progress. The Total Force Integration Directorate provided a draft (at time of report) strategic plan awaiting leadership approval and further guidance for implementation efforts. Air Force senior leadership has since approved the strategic plan and it has been implemented. Some metrics existed to evaluate transformation test initiatives, but we need to know if expanded integration creates the desired effects and whether it creates any unintended consequences. A special working group comprised of stakeholders from the active, Guard and Reserve components is dedicated to developing, refining and fielding a comprehensive set of metrics.

Total Force Integration will provide America with a smaller, more capable, affordable Air Force through new organizational constructs and a focus on Total Force across every emerging mission. We have used the expression "Total Force" for twenty-five years, but this bold new construct has created a more tangible, more substantive texture and form of a modern Air Force composed of three dynamic components. Within this construct, we think of all Airmen as members of a Total Force team providing security for the Nation as a more efficient, more lethal Air Force while preserving the very best of cultural heritage from each of our components.

Our Airmen--Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve--have proven tremendously successful across the spectrum of operations from humanitarian efforts to Homeland Defense operations and the Global War on Terrorism. We will continue transforming to meet the challenges of a dynamic

world by rebalancing the force and realigning our structure into a Total Force that meets increased demands for persistent intelligence, rapid mobility and precision strike capabilities. Total Force decision-making has been an inclusive process; all stakeholders have a voice in ensuring their contributions to the Air Force best supports national strategy. It is founded upon the trust developed between our three components based on a common goal of providing America with Air and Space Power as a team. We will seek a partnership with other players within the Department of Defense as we move forward. Total Force is reflected in everything we do as an Air Force from budgeting to policy making to organizing our three components to mission assignments to deploying forces at home and abroad.

We are America's Airmen. Our mission is to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—we fly and we fight—in air, space and cyberspace. For the past 15 years, our Air Force team has proven its mettle and skill every day. Since the days of DESERT STORM, we have been globally and continuously engaged in combat. We will continue to show the same ingenuity, courage, resolve and will achieve success in our three most important challenges: winning the Global War on Terror; developing and caring for our Airmen; and maintaining, modernizing and recapitalizing our aircraft and equipment. Total Force Integration is a critical theme that is woven throughout our three priorities -- and a filter by which we look at every possible option for delivering the best capability.

Winning the Global War on Terror (GWOT)

Our first priority is to maintain focus on winning the GWOT. We will continue to operate as part of a true Joint and Coalition team, multiplying the effectiveness of our partners to win this war. We fly and we fight—whether we're flying A-10s over Afghanistan; flying F-16s over Iraq; operating and maneuvering communications satellites in geosynchronous orbit; remotely piloting Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) patrolling over Baghdad; or maintaining vigilance over our Nation's homeland in an E-3 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft. All Airmen, no matter whether they are Active, Guard or Reserve, "operationally" contribute to this mission everyday

We must keep in mind that the GWOT is not solely defined by today's headlines or locations. It will be a long war, with shifting flashpoints and constantly evolving threats. The character and capabilities of potential U.S. adversaries are increasingly uncertain, veiled, growing and changing, as both state and non-state actors acquire advanced technology and the means to either acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). The entire Air Force, not just the Active Duty component, must remain ready to meet these challenges. To meet this imperative, the Air Force resources, equips, trains and inspects our Guard and Reserve to the highest possible levels. This strategic choice, made years ago by Air Force leaders, gives us an immediate "ready-to-deploy" capability and contributes to our ability to maximize volunteerism and minimize mobilization.

Maintaining a strong defense able to overcome and defeat these threats remains an imperative for our Nation. Currently, the Air Force, working as a Total Force team, can command the global commons of air and space and significantly influence the global common of cyberspace; however, we cannot indefinitely maintain this advantage using the current technology of the air and space systems and equipment comprising our existing force structure. In addition, we cannot continue to exploit the capabilities of the worlds' premier Total Force if we do not bring our Air Reserve Components -- the Guard and Reserve -- with us into the rapidly expanding new and emerging missions that are on the top of nearly every Combatant Commander's list. These emerging missions are relatively new to our Air Force "Sovereign Option" toolbox and largely in the Active Component. Our Total Force Integration effort expands our Guard and Reserve participation in these "reachback" missions and continues our long-standing "side-by-side" relationship.

Air and Space Operations in OIF and OEF

Since 9/11 the Air Force has filled over 363,000 personnel requirements. At any one point in time, the Guard and Reserve constitute 20% (May 06 percentage) of our forward deployed forces. These Airmen continue to deliver key Air Force capabilities of precision engagement, rapid global mobility and information superiority to OEF and OIF missions.

In Iraq, the Air Force has flown over 237,000 sorties, while in Afghanistan, Airmen have flown over 143,000 missions. Counted among these sorties are missions ranging from airlift and aeromedical evacuation, to close air support

(CAS) missions to protect ground troops as well as provide them with precise fire support and sensor capabilities. Today, Air National Guard C-130's from four states and F-16's from both the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve join approximately 190 Air Force aircraft supporting operations in Southwest Asia. Leading the way in reconnaissance and imagery, the Air Force is currently flying Predator UAV missions 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. This capability will grow from 8 to 12 total orbits in 2006 to meet increased demand. The Air Reserve Component is already joining their Active Duty counterparts in operating this remarkable aircraft as it provides an effective reachback mission, while minimizing deployment of Guardsmen and Citizen Airmen. They are an important part of the Air Force's roadmap to provide Combatant Commanders with even more capability in the future. Bolstering these capabilities are Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System (TARS) equipped F-16s flown by Air National Guard units.

Air and Space Operations in ONE

Even while fully engaged in OEF and OIF, the Air Force simultaneously contributes to Operation NOBLE EAGLE—the defense of the homeland. Through a variety of efforts, the Air Force continues to guard the skies of our Nation from coast to coast. The Air Force's principal Homeland Defense mission is Air Defense and preserving the air sovereignty of the United States and its territories.

Since 9/11, over 44,000 fighter, aerial refueling and airborne early warning sorties have been flown in defense of the U.S. Air National Guard and Air Force

Reserve forces have flown 32,000 of these missions. This is a true Total Force mission, leveraging the combined capabilities of the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Regular Air Force components to provide seamlessly orchestrated Command and Control and refueling support for fighter aircraft operating from alert sites throughout the U.S.

The range, flexibility, persistence and precision inherent in U.S. air and space power provide Joint warfighters with a unique tool set for creating war-winning results with a relatively small footprint. Air and Space operations stand ready to continue providing these important resources to OIF, OEF and ONE, as well as exploring new ways to lead the way in the GWOT.

Aeromedical Evacuations

As early as 1918, the military has used aircraft to move the wounded. The Air Force continued this proud tradition with the aeromedical evacuation of over 11,000 wounded personnel from Afghanistan and Iraq. The aeromedical evacuation system has transformed to ensure the Air Force can conduct rapid and precise operations in an expeditionary environment – at home and abroad. The placement of aeromedical crews in forward locations continues the chain of survival that starts on the battlefield with self-aid and buddy care. The chain continues through Expeditionary Medical Support hospitals, to aeromedical in-flight care and finally to stateside medical centers within as little as 72 hours. Expeditionary aeromedical operations reduce the necessity and large footprint of theater medical assets and conserves valuable health care resources.

The force mix of aeromedical evacuation crewmembers consists of 12% Regular Air Force and 88% Air Reserve Component. This use of the Total Force was best demonstrated in the fall of 2005 during the swift aeromedical evacuation of over 3,800 sick and elderly people threatened by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Disaster Relief Operations

While fully engaged in GWOT operations, the Air Force answered the call for help in the wake of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Hurricane Katrina devastated an entire region of the southern U.S. While destruction of infrastructure stifled ground transportation, Airmen continued to reach flooded areas and bring relief. The Air Force flew over 5,000 sorties, airlifting more than 30,000 passengers and 16,000 tons of cargo and accomplishing 5,500 search and rescue saves. Additionally, Air Force operations were a Total Force effort, incorporating Guard and Reserve capabilities into airlift and rescue operations as well as into the establishment of state-of-the-art medical facilities that treated over 17,000 patients. Moreover, the Air Force Reserve's Hurricane Hunter aircraft flew constant surveillance, warning the people and the leadership of these powerful storms, reducing the number of potential casualties by thousands. They accomplished their missions despite flying from a forward operating location because Keesler Air Force Base, their normal operating base and their home, was in the hurricane's path and suffered substantial wind and flood damage.

Future natural disasters and relief operations will likely be similar to those faced by the U.S. over the past year. Major populations requiring immense

support are often isolated from the infrastructure that is their lifeline. Airpower, and its associated support capabilities, provides the capability to overcome terrestrial obstacles and deliver aid directly to those in need. Always seeking new ways to innovate and improve, the Air Force will continue its ongoing transition to a force with unprecedented capability for civil support and Homeland Defense. We are working closely with the National Guard leadership to organize these capabilities for regional response. We are coordinating with the National Guard Bureau to populate their list of essential elements to include transportation, engineers, general-purpose security forces, Civil Support teams, medical, communications and logistics. We call this new regional response capability a “Combat Support Wing.”

Developing and Caring for Our Airmen

Our Regular Air Force Airmen, Air National Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists are building on their inheritance of courage, excellence and innovation. They are highly educated and resourceful, and have created the most lethal Air Force that has ever existed. We must continue to look for ways to maintain and improve their training, their personal and professional development and their quality of life, so they may continue to meet the commitments of today while preparing for the challenges of tomorrow.

Airmen today are contributing to combat operations in ways never before envisioned—as convoy drivers and escorts, detainee guards and translators to give a few examples. Other Total Force Airmen routinely serve “outside the wire” as Special Tactics operators, Joint Terminal Attack Controllers and Special

Operations Weather personnel. All of these Airmen must receive the proper training to survive, fight and win. We are working within the Air Force, as well as with our Joint warfighting partners, to ensure that all Airmen are fully prepared when they arrive in the combat zone.

To continue ensuring that our Airmen are prepared for combat, effectively developed and properly supported to provide our Nation with the best Air Force in the world, we must continue to focus on the balance of forces and specialties between Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve components. We are diligently examining the capabilities we need to provide to the warfighter and to operate and train at home. We continue to realign and associate appropriate missions to our most stressed areas and are watchful for any new areas that show signs of strain.

As we look to the future in implementing Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) and Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) decisions, we must ensure a seamless transition to new organizational constructs and missions while preserving the unique capabilities resident in our Regular Air Force, Air National Guard and Reserve communities. Examining functions for Competitive Sourcing opportunities or conversion to civilian performance will continue to be one of our many tools for striking the correct balance of missions across the Total Force. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Pace stated, "We must transform if we are to meet future challenges." One of the Air Force's more significant commitments to long-term transformation is the creation of the Total Force Integration Directorate. This new directorate is responsible for

coordinating with the Guard and Reserve for new emerging mission assignments and development of Total Force organizational constructs. Working with our partners in the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, the Air Force is maximizing our overall Joint combat capability.

The Air Force plans to shift investment from "traditional" combat forces, with single-mission capabilities, to multi-role forces by aggressively divesting itself of older systems. The result will be a force structure with expanded capability to combat conventional threats while continuing to wage the GWOT. Simply stated, the Air Force will become a leaner, yet more capable force through modernization and recapitalization of selected weapon systems with a commitment to networked and integrated Joint systems.

Our Total Force initiatives will maximize efficiencies and enhance combat capability through innovative organizational constructs. We have developed an organizational construct based on the success of an associate model in use by the Regular Air Force and Air Force Reserve since 1968. Associate units are comprised of two or more components operationally integrated, but whose chains of command remain separate. This model capitalizes on inherent strengths of the Air Force's three components, ensuring partnership in virtually every facet of Air Force operations, while preserving each component's unique heraldry and history. Increased integration allows Regular Air Force personnel to capitalize on experience levels inherent in the Guard and Reserve, while building vital relationships necessary to sustain successful combat operations. It allows us to achieve better use of our aircraft while reducing the strain of overseas

deployments for our Guard and Reserve volunteers through predictable rotations and reachback mission expansion.

Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve members will continue to support the Air Force's global commitments and conduct vital Homeland Defense and Security missions. Total Force initiatives will integrate Air Force components into missions critical to future warfighting: ISR, UAV and space operations. These missions are ideally suited for the Guard and Reserve since many provide direct "reachback" support to the Joint warfighter from U.S. locations. Using this approach will improve our operational effectiveness, reduce our overseas footprint, reduce reliance on involuntary mobilization and provide more stability for our Airmen and their civilian employers.

Our ongoing Total Force Integration effort benefits from a robust, dynamic, cross-functional coordination process, involving the headquarters, all regular component MAJCOMs, the National Guard Bureau, Adjutants General Representatives and Air Force Reserve Command.

The Air Force continues to make significant progress on Total Force initiatives such as the Richmond-Langley F-22A integration in Virginia; community basing in Vermont; F-16 Integration at Hill AFB, Utah; new Predator missions in Texas, Arizona, New York, North Dakota, California and at the Air Force Warfare Center in Nevada; and C-17 associate units in Alaska and Hawaii. We are also working additional initiatives such as C-130 Active Associate units in Colorado and Wyoming; a C-5 Flight Training Unit in Texas; C-40 Integration in

Illinois; and Centralized Intermediate Repair Facilities in Illinois, Connecticut, Louisiana, Utah, South Carolina, Georgia, North Carolina and Florida.

The Air Force, through its Total Force Integration Directorate, is continuing a broad effort to ensure that new Total Force concepts are embedded in our doctrine, policy directives, instructions and training. We are creating procedures to ensure resource and other decisions related to Total Force initiatives become routine parts of the planning and programming processes. The goal is clear: take greater advantage of Total Force elements and capabilities in the way the Air Force does business.

The Air Force is transforming from a Cold War force posture to a structure that supports expeditionary warfare and leverages Total Force capabilities. Our single greatest obstacle to our necessary transformation is "legacy" legislation that limits effective use of our Guard and Reserve in training of all components; use of AGRs and Technicians for both the fulltime support of our drill status force as well as on going operations; and the "dual-hat" authority for commanders of multi-component units like our 116th Air Control Unit in the Georgia Air National Guard. The bottom line: more efficient use of our Regular Air Force, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve assets increases our flexibility and capacity to be a more agile and lethal combat force and a more vigilant homeland defender.

Maintenance, Modernization and Recapitalization

One of our most daunting challenges is maintaining the military utility of our aircraft as reflected in mission readiness, maintenance costs and other factors. We have been actively engaged in combat for the past 15 years. We

currently maintain an Air Bridge to Southwest Asia. Our state of alert for GWOT requires us to operate at an elevated and sustained operations tempo (OPSTEMPO). Increased investment and increased maintenance tempo can keep our older aircraft flying and slow their decaying military utility, but equipment age and use are unrelenting factors. As we move forward with Total Force initiatives, we will be working diligently to maintain, modernize and recapitalize our forces in the Active Duty, Guard and Reserve.

Presently, we have the oldest aircraft inventory in our history. Our aircraft are an average of over 23 years old—older in many cases than those who fly and maintain them. In particular, our inventory of tanker aircraft averages over 41 years old, and our C-130 tactical airlifters average over 25 years old. Many of these older tanker and transport aircraft reside within the Air Reserve Component, which makes them an important piece of our modernization and recapitalization plans.

As our equipment ages, it requires more frequent maintenance and replacement of parts; meanwhile, increased OPSTEMPO accelerates wear and tear on our equipment and operational infrastructure, exposes our equipment to extreme conditions and, in some cases, delays routine maintenance. We must recapitalize our aircraft and operational infrastructure, as well as modernize our processes for services, support and information delivery in order to maintain the grueling pace required into the foreseeable future. We must do so in a fiscally prudent manner.

The Air Force's plan is to retire and replace our oldest, least capable and most expensive aircraft and equipment, as well as accepting a manageable level of risk in order to selectively maintain some older systems until newer systems are on the ramp. Our resulting force structure has 25 percent fewer fighters and 10 percent fewer total aircraft. However, despite its smaller size, the Air Force of tomorrow is a more capable force. The anticipated 2025 fighter force is 100 percent PGM-capable and 90+ percent low observable. Total Force initiatives allow higher crew ratios that increase utilization in wartime and efficiency in peacetime. Our modernization plan paves the way for reserve components to fly newer, more capable airplanes as they are introduced rather than flying older legacy aircraft that are less capable than their Active Duty counterparts. In addition to the original Total Force initiatives highlighted previously, we are collaborating extensively with all stakeholders to determine potential future missions of all of our components. Moving all components across our emerging missions is a critical component of the Total Force initiatives. Emerging missions include Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS); Joint Cargo Aircraft; Warfighting Headquarters, Command, Control, Communications, Computer, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR); space operations; Air and Space Operations Centers; Contingency Response Groups; Long Range Strike; A-T38s; Foreign Military Training; Battlefield Airmen and Information Operations, among others. Maintaining, modernizing and recapitalizing our forces in all three components is the right thing to do for America and the Air Force is committed to that end.

Summary

We have received a proud heritage forged through the ingenuity, courage and strength of the Airmen who preceded us. Our duty today is to deliver their Air Force to the limitless horizon ahead of us. The mission of the Air Force remains to fly, fight and win whether we are delivering lethal effects against insurgents in Iraq, protecting the skies of the U.S. against terrorist attacks, providing a Global Positioning System that is essential to our modern military and the global economy, or providing relief to victims of natural disasters both at home and abroad.

Total Force Integration is the way we operate now and how we will provide Air and Space power to the Nation in the future. The Air Force will continue to deliver sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America and its global interests—flying and fighting—in air, space and cyberspace. Total Force Integration is the right roadmap to do this in a fiscally responsible manner while continuing to focus on our three priorities: winning the Global War on Terror; developing and caring for our Airmen; and maintaining, modernizing and recapitalizing our aircraft and equipment.

The Total Force Initiative has been a collaborative effort and needs to remain fully integrated in order to meet the requirements of combatant commanders. All members of the Total Force have missions and will continue to have missions across the spectrum of Air Force operations. Total Force Initiatives and the Air Force's procurement strategy is committed to the resourcing and readiness of Air National Guard. We look forward to continuing to

work with the Chief of the National Guard Bureau and this committee to improve our Total Force

**Testimony of
Brigadier General (Ret.) Stephen M. Koper**

**President
National Guard Association of the United States**

**Armed Services Committee
U.S. House of Representatives**

June 13, 2006

Chairman Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today on issues related to H.R. 5200, the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. The National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS) thanks you for your years of outstanding support to the National Guard.

As many of you know, NGAUS was formed in 1878 by former militia officers of both the Union and the Confederacy to seek united representation for the militia before the Congress. They were concerned that the militia, a constitutional pillar of the republic, was being left to languish in disinterest and neglect. How, they wondered, could forces created by the founding fathers and so recently locked in mortal combat in the shadow of their own homes, be so consistently short-changed and dismissed? They were successful in their efforts in bringing the Congress to the aid of the militia.

Mr. Chairman, how little times have changed.

NGAUS is here today because, as President Bush, the commander in chief of the National Guard of the United States said in a major speech in February of this year, "For 128 years, the National Guard Association has been fighting for the citizen-soldiers who fight for America." We once again earnestly request your assistance.

Although the Guard wasn't at the table during the formulation of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the revelation that the National Guard is no longer a "strategic reserve" but rather an "operational force" changes the landscape for the

foreseeable future as to the level that senior National Guard leaders should be involved in Defense Department planning and programming.

Today, the Guard is needed more now than ever and the active forces simply can't get the job done without us. Guard members have proven time and again that if given the right equipment and training, they will perform on an equal basis with their Active component comrades. The Total Force concept introduced in 1970 by then Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird works, but only if the Guard is provided the resources it needs and is treated as a **full** partner in planning, programming, budgeting, and strategy formulation.

If you were to ask almost any senior Active Army or Air Force leader why the Guard wasn't at the table, they would emphatically reply "they were at the table." It is now generally conceded in testimony here on the Hill, that they were not. We believe that the Department of Defense is still deeply mired in an institutional bias toward the National Guard. Let me give you a contemporary example that seems to reflect this seeming inability to embrace the Guard.

A visit to the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) public web site reveals an interesting perspective into how the Department of Defense perceives the mission and capabilities of the National Guard.

USNORTHCOM's mission definition is to: conduct operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories and interests

within the assigned area of responsibility (AOR - which includes our borders between Canada and Mexico); and as directed by the President or Secretary of Defense, provide military assistance to civil authorities including consequence management operations.

However, upon closer scrutiny of the web site, there is no perceptible reference to coordinating their efforts with the National Guard. It is also interesting to note that USNORTHCOM uses Article 1, Section 8, Clause 15 of the Constitution of the United States“to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrection, and repel invasions” as justification of their mission. But, again, no reference at all to the National Guard! This seemingly insignificant oversight highlights a serious lack of leadership perspective that could promote a close working relationship with the states, their governors and the Guard.

More simply put, if cooperation is our common intent, why not say so!

During the Cold War, the Guard was seen as a strategic reserve in part because the Active forces consisted of end strengths at twice the levels they are today. Foreseeing then the increased level of forces that would be needed to perform peacekeeping operations and to fight the Global War on Terrorism was a practical impossibility. But that was 1989 and today, as the DoD recognized in its preface to the 2006 QDR Report, they are “still encumbered with a Cold War organization and mentality in many aspects of Department operations...and that it will seek new and more flexible authorities in budget, finance, acquisition and personnel”. NGAUS believes that same line of thinking

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should apply to how they interact with the Guard on a daily basis. More importantly, engaging in denial is counter-productive.

In our view, this situation can no longer be swept under the rug. We must do all that we can to provide the American people with the most cost effective defense structure. Certainly we believe that such structure, in many cases, is the National Guard.

The Department of Defense announced in late May its opposition to all sections of H.R. 5200 and launched a campaign in Congress to either delay consideration of the legislation by referring it to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves or to dismiss the bill completely on the grounds that neither the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or Secretary of Defense believes the changes are either necessary or warranted.

Unfortunately, this same dismissive response to the Guard reaching out to be heard, as strategic level force-structure, policy, and funding decisions are being made, is the very reason legislation of this nature is so sorely needed.

The fact of the matter is that senior Guard leadership has only been involved in Pentagon decision making as an afterthought, requiring the adjutant's general, governors, Congress and NGAUS to launch vigorous campaigns to reverse decisions that were made without adequate Guard input. Action by the Senate was necessary to remind the Army of this very fact earlier this year.

The Guard's only goal is to have a seat at the table and a relative voice in the decisions that affect our readiness. Based on the Pentagon's standard response to these entreaties, the National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006 has been offered as a means to achieve that level of Defense Department involvement we have earned and deserve.

While the Secretary of Defense is wont to say, "The War on Terror could not be fought without the National Guard", clearly a serious disconnect still exists. NGAUS believes the Guard leadership should not be made to wait at the kitchen table for something to eat while the rest of the "family" is feasting in the dining room.

What the National Guard really desires is a culture change at the Pentagon that results in a seat at the table where Guard inputs are genuinely considered and subsequently factored into strategy, programming, policy and funding decisions with a clear understanding of the Guard's capabilities and unique force structure and missions. It's nothing more than demonstrating respect to a force that we depend on to augment our Active forces and to protect our homeland.

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I sincerely thank you for your time today and am happy to answer any questions.

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TESTIMONY OF
MAJOR GENERAL FRANCIS D. VAVALA

VICE - PRESIDENT
ADJUTANTS GENERAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES (AGAUS)

ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JUNE 13, 2006

Chairman Hunter, members of the committee, thank you for asking the Adjutants General Association of the United States (AGAUS) to testify today on issues related to H.R. 5200, the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. On behalf of the 54 Adjutants General of the several states and territories I am proud to represent the AGAUS and its president, Major General Roger Lempke, who sends his regrets due to the untimely loss of his sister. General Lempke thanks each of you for your years of outstanding support to the National Guard.

Mr. Hunter, committee members, you have just heard testimony from several distinguished senior members of the Department of Defense. The Department of Defense is on record as opposing the National Defense Enhancement and Empowerment Act of 2006.

With all due respect to these distinguished gentlemen, we, the Adjutants General, disagree. The National Governors' Association representing the several states in a May 31, 2006 letter expressed their support for this important legislation. We ask you consider the advice of the Governors and the Adjutants General in your deliberations on this important piece of legislation.

Since the Total Force Policy was enacted in the 1970s, we saw an Air Force that embraced it, while the Army and the Army Guard engaged in fierce competition for resources. For example, in the 80s we saw the Congress recognize the need for additional airlift and took action to purchase the C-130Hs for the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve. As we learned in every conflict,

contingency, and Desert Storm, the Air National Guard C-130Hs proved indispensable to the war fighter. With Hurricanes Katrina and Rita we again saw these same airplanes and Guard crews responding to citizens in need.

I wonder what might have happened had not Congress, AGAUS and the Governors united to provide these aircraft to the Air National Guard.

During the mid-1990s an Army initiative to dramatically reduce Army National Guard end strength by nearly 50,000 was successfully overcome by strong opposition from congress and AGAUS. About ten years later when the Guard was at its highest deployment level ever in Iraq, 50,000 militia service members were still available to save lives, restore order, and begin rebuilding New Orleans and Mississippi after they were devastated by Hurricane Katrina. I often wonder what might have happened had not Congress and AGAUS united to save force structure we sensed, but didn't know, would be needed later.

I have been the vice president of the AGAUS for just over one year—but it is beginning to seem like a lifetime. Instead of working tactical issues concerning enhancing the National Guard 'around the edges' the Association has been forced to engage in major battles with the Department of Defense with the very survival of the National Guard at stake.

In some cases the Association uncovered initiatives at work within DoD that even the Chief, National Guard Bureau (NGB) was not privy to. After outing these close hold schemes we've been called and lectured to by the Acting Secretary of the Air Force for not adhering to the DoD position, heard of

discussions to investigate the legitimacy of the AGAUS organization, and been told our travel records could be reviewed to find inconsistencies in duty status.

On behalf of all 54 Adjutants General of the several states and territories let me be unambiguously clear. Our greatest desire is to work with the Department of Defense to achieve the strong, appropriate National Guard needed to defeat terrorism and secure our homeland. We and the Governors we serve must have a voice that is heard not only in the state houses and in the Congress but within the Department of Defense.

We do not accept the premise that all good ideas relating to the National Guard are reserved for the Department of Defense. We don't want to confront DoD—we want to work with them. We also want our Chief, LTG Blum, to be permitted to fulfill the role of Chief, National Guard Bureau, which is to serve as the link of communication between the states and DoD. Just as Air Force commanders and Army division commanders, the Adjutants General are the best source for information about organizational health and readiness. LTG Blum is the most competent senior official in the nation to deal with the health and future of the entire National Guard institution.

Yet time and again during my tenure, and before, the AGAUS has been forced to come directly to Congress to either reverse wrong headed plans or to force DoD to work with the states. That is not a new issue for this Committee.

I don't like a system that must work this way, and I suspect that Congress does not like having to 'get in the middle' all the time. During the cold war years

when the Army National Guard was a strategic reserve, issues concerning readiness and equipment were important, but not vital to the nation's survival and safety of our citizens. Today, by demand everyone agrees we have become an operational reserve which cannot afford to falter.

The nation cannot continue to depend on processes that rely on strong personalities and persistence over logic and need without eventually failing to have the capabilities needed for the next round against terrorism or catastrophic natural disaster.

Current DoD processes do not sufficiently incorporate National Guard Bureau and state inputs when determining how to structure, equip, man, train, and provide resources to the National Guard. The Chief, NGB is a lone three-star general who must contend with the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) while bringing some form of integrated vision to the air and ground arms of the National Guard. Each three-star service director must compete with active duty three-star counterparts for resources with one important difference. The services have one three-star for each staff discipline (personnel, intelligence, operations, etc.) while each director must alone represent these disciplines for the National Guard. By any stretch of the imagination this is simply not a fair fight.

In many cases the Department of Defense anticipates that the congress will fix what the active component did not fund. The National Guard and Reserve equipment account also provides support that the active component did not support. You deal with the Guard's MILCON program each year, because the

active component generally does not support the Guard program. Hence, the Adjutants General become involved through our Congressional delegations.

Compare the National Guard which supports two services with over 450,000 Soldiers and Airmen while having specific state missions with the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard, with less than 50,000 service members, has a four-star commandant with access to the tank and JCS, two three-star headquarters general officers, and two three-star field commanders. During the Cold War when the National Guard served as a strategic reserve and the Coast Guard mission was front-line the DoD leadership scheme was perhaps appropriate. However, today the National Guard is front-line in two missions—fighting terrorism overseas and securing our homeland. The need for changing organizational make up and processes to accommodate these front-line roles should be obvious.

There is another reason the National Guard must become more empowered. The Hurricane Katrina response highlighted again the dual, state and federal mission that is unique to the National Guard. Each state Governor has an important stake in sustaining a strong and relevant National Guard within his or her state to assure citizen safety. The only formal advocate for this within DoD is the Chief, NGB. Securing the homeland is undoubtedly the most vital joint mission this nation's military has; yet, the only component with shared resources is not represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The Department of Defense witnesses have stated that the Guard is represented in the total force senior decision making. We have also heard that the needs of the states are considered in the deliberations within the Department.

We have no doubt that this is the intent; however, the results of the current process reveal a broke process with significant shortcomings that must be fixed now.

The first step in improving is recognizing there is a problem. I suggest that the Governors, the Adjutants General, and some members of Congress have recognized there is a problem. Federal law requires the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to consult with and obtain the consent of the Governor before making any change in the branch, organization or allotment of a National Guard unit located entirely within a state and before relocating or withdrawing any unit of the National Guard aircraft and reorganized units within and among states without informing or consulting with the nation's Governors. For that matter, the Air Force made its BRAC decisions without consulting the U.S. Department of Homeland Security or the National Guard Bureau (the statutory "channel of communications" between the Secretaries of the Army and the Air Force and the Governors of the several states).

The Department of Defense has now repeated its pattern of unilateralism with Program Budget Decisions (PBDs) that cut up to 38,000 National Guard soldiers and airmen. These decisions, like the Air Force BRAC decisions that preceded them, were made behind closed doors without communicating or

consulting with the Governors, their Adjutants General or even the service secretaries' "channel of communications," the National Guard Bureau.

The House Armed Services Committee (HASC) is currently considering delaying action on the National Guard Empowerment Act by assigning it to the Commission on National Guard and Reserve (CNGR) to study and extending the Commission's completion date by six months. While hastily enacting legislation is never advisable the National Guard is at a vital point that demands the level of leadership sought by the National Guard Empowerment Act now.

The National Guard is entering a reset mode. The National Guard force level in Iraq is declining. Units now home are beginning the process of rebuilding, refitting, and re-qualifying for the next call. The equipment situation is marginal at best, as you all know. The Guard is being called upon to support more frequently and in greater numbers for homeland security missions. How the National Guard emerges from this confluence of resource and equipping issues will directly determine its readiness for the next round of the Global War on Terrorism.

The National Guard Empowerment Act must be passed this session so that enhanced leadership can overcome the myriad of issues facing the National Guard. Assigning this legislation to the CNGR will 'kick the can' down the road another two or three years—the reset period will near the end by then.

The National Guard Empowerment Act was introduced in April (S.2658/H.R.5200) to ensure the National Guard is no longer neglected. Not since the Goldwater Nichols Act of 1987 has such a sweeping change to the DoD

military organization been proposed. Of course Goldwater Nichols did not envision the end of the Cold War and the emergence of terrorism as the nation's main enemy. Nor did it anticipate fighting a war within our borders. It also did not anticipate the sudden emergence of catastrophic natural disasters in densely populated areas that quickly overwhelm local authorities. Most importantly, it did not anticipate the pivotal role the National Guard is playing in this new era. Only prompt Congressional action on this legislation will ensure the National Guard is ready for the round against terrorism and the next major catastrophe at home.

In closing, I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and I look forward to your questions.

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

JUNE 13, 2006



Mike Huckabee
Governor of Arkansas
Chairman

Janet Napolitano
Governor of Arizona
Vice Chair

Agostino C. Scheppach
Executive Director

May 31, 2006

The Honorable Thomas M. Davis III
Chairman
Committee on Government Reform
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Honorable Gene Taylor
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman and Representative Taylor:

The nation's governors thank you for your support of the National Guard and for introducing the National Defense Enhancement and National Guard Empowerment Act of 2006. Your legislation represents a major step in ensuring the men and women of our Guard are well organized, trained, equipped, compensated and supported to accomplish their federal and state missions.

Recent attempts to reduce the end strength of the National Guard and redirect its missions come at a time when Guard members have provided nearly 50 percent of the combat forces in Iraq, the bulk of the U.S. personnel in the Balkans and the Sinai Peninsula, and comprised nearly 90 percent of the troops on the ground in Louisiana and Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina. Unfortunately the proposed reforms were developed without consultation with governors, the commanders-in-chief of the Guard when serving in the states. Leaders of the active military, which have relied heavily on the Guard as a combat force, continue to overlook the role of governors and the critical mission of the Guard in serving their states. As you work to pass legislation to enhance the National Guard, we believe four fundamental principles should guide your efforts.

First, Congress should preserve and promote the dual mission of the Guard. As the only Reserve component that performs both state and federal missions, the National Guard has a unique standing among the services. Located in more than 3,000 communities throughout the nation, Army and Air National Guard units are a ready, forward-deployed, rapid response force for Homeland Security missions. They serve also as an effective force multiplier to civil authority's emergency response efforts to natural disasters and acts of terrorism. These critical roles must not be forgotten in any restructuring or rebalancing of the force. The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) should reaffirm these activities as an integral part of the ongoing mission of the National Guard and ensure they are provided the funding, training and other resources necessary to fully meet the additional responsibilities inherent in today's homeland defense environment.

Second, it is critical that the Guard receive training and equipment to handle both its state and federal missions. While governors commend the Army and the Air Force for their efforts to enhance training and better equip the National Guard, more needs to be done. Many states and territories are experiencing equipment shortages in critical mission areas such as responding to forest fires and other emergencies because equipment remains in the combat zone after deployment. Attention must be paid to reequipping Army

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National Guard units returning from active duty abroad to ensure they are prepared to fulfill domestic missions or train for possible redeployment.

Third, Congress should provide adequate benefits for National Guard men and women and their families, regardless of mobilization status. Medical and dental readiness of Guard men and women transcends all components of training and equipping the force. Keeping our troops and their families healthy improves readiness and promotes retention. The 2006 National Defense Authorization Act, which offers three TriCare options on a cost-share basis for Reserve Component members, was a step in the right direction. Congress should take the next step of authorizing funds that would allow all members of the Guard to access TriCare coverage.


Finally, Congress should assist employers who support our National Guard men and women. Governors understand the vital role that employers of National Guard members play in supporting our citizen-soldiers. Several states are following the lead of private employers to make up gaps between civilian pay and active-duty pay for state employees who are also members of the Guard. As the Global War on Terror continues, Congress should examine relief for employers such as tax credits and enhancing federal measures to address pay gaps for activated Guard members.

Thank you again for your support and commitment to the Army and Air National Guard. We look forward to working with you and the Administration to recognize, promote and enhance this critical national resource.

Sincerely,



Governor Mike Huckabee
Chairman



Governor Janet Napolitano
Vice Chair

**QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS SUBMITTED FOR THE
RECORD**

JUNE 13, 2006

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SKELTON

Mr. SKELTON. General Cody, How many Army National Guardsmen have been deployed one time; how many have been deployed twice; and how many have been deployed three times?

General CODY. From September 2001 to June 2006, and including those Soldiers who were deployed in September 2001, there have been 169,925 National Guard Soldiers deployed, with 157,919 being deployed once; 11,331 being deployed twice; and 675 being deployed three or more times.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ORTIZ

Mr. ORTIZ. I understand that the Northern Command (NORTHCOM) has four national guard generals. Am I correct when I say that, that serve on the Northern Command staff?

Admiral GIAMBASTIANI. Here are the National Guard and Reserve general officers assigned to Headquarters, NORAD and USNORTHCOM:

- Major General Paul Sullivan, Air National Guard, Chief of Staff for NORAD and USNORTHCOM (a Joint Staff Chairman's 10 position)
- Major General Richard C. Nash, Army National Guard, Special Assistant to the Commander, USNORTHCOM for National Guard Matters
- Major General Robert B. Ostenberg, U.S. Army Reserve, Deputy to the Commander for Reserve Forces, USNORTHCOM
- PENDING—Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, NORAD (Nomination Package Working)
- Brigadier General Steven E. Foster, Air National Guard, Mobilization Assistant to the Director of Plans, NORAD and USNORTHCOM
- Brigadier General (Select) Mark Kyle, U.S. Air Force Reserve, Vice Director of Operations, USNORTHCOM

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO

Ms. BORDALLO. I have taken numerous trips to Iraq. In fact, I was just in Iraq last week. I have learned that many of the national guard units were supplemented by active duty forces where manpower was needed. This we see all the time.

Has the Department of Defense considered building on this model on a more permanent basis? That is, could there be a construct where in peacetime an active duty soldier or soldiers or officers were assigned full-time to a national guard unit?

General CODY. The Active Component/Reserve Component Command & Staff Integration Program (AC/RC CSIP) was implemented by the Chief of Staff, Army in October 2000. The purpose of the program is to improve integration of training expertise, operational experience, and leadership skills among the three Army components. Since the program's inception, 18 AC and 12 RC officers have commanded battalion level CSIP units. Currently there are four AC officers commanding RC units and no USAR or ARNG officers commanding AC units.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. DAVIS OF CALIFORNIA

Ms. DAVIS. Did the DOD inform national guard leadership about the Southwest mission? Or do you think that that would not have been appropriate if they had done that?

Secretary ENGLAND. Yes, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General H. Steven Blum, was fully informed of the mission to support the Border Patrol along the Southwest border, and participated in its planning.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER

Mr. MILLER. It is my understanding that the Air Force estimates it will cost \$169.8 million dollars to fully fund the repairs at Santa Rosa Island. The repairs are necessary due to damage from several recent hurricanes. Earlier in the year the Department of Defense attempted to fund these repairs through an emergency supplemental bill but the Office of Management and Budget disapproved the request. What is the Air Force's plan to fully fund the necessary repairs to Santa Rosa Island?

General CORLEY. The Air Force is committed to restore full access and protection of critical test capabilities at the Santa Rosa Island Range Complex test sites. The construction funds are needed to restore roadways, landmass, and seawalls. The FY08-13 program is currently being reviewed by the Air Force Corporate structure in conjunction with OSD guidance. This process will continue until the end of December 2006, prior to submission of the President's Budget in February 2007. We will make every effort to fund these requirements in the FY08-09 program.

